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ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE MARSHALL PLAN:

| | |
|--|----|
| ECA Summarizes European Recovery | 43 |
| Western Germany's Progress • Statement by John J. McCloy | 45 |

ACTION ON GERMAN ELECTION PLAN IN THE U.N. •

| | |
|---|----|
| Statements by John Sherman Cooper | 54 |
|---|----|

REPLY TO ATTACKS ON U.S. ATTITUDE TOWARD HUMAN RIGHTS • Statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt

| | |
|---------------------|----|
| Roosevelt | 59 |
|---------------------|----|



For index see back cover



The Department of State bulletin

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication compiled and edited in the Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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Achievements of the Marshall Plan

ECA SUMMARIZES EUROPEAN RECOVERY

The following was released to the press by ECA on December 30:

The American people tomorrow close the books on the most daring and constructive venture in peacetime international relations the world has ever seen: The Marshall Plan.

It comes to an end tomorrow along with the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), the agency which built a fact out of the plan.

While the Marshall Plan is thus marked complete exactly 6 months ahead of the June 30, 1952 schedule laid down by Congress, the legal powers and functions given to ECA are to finish out their allotted span under the newly created Mutual Security Agency (MSA). Into this new agency, with the new job of helping Europe to gird itself against possible Communist aggression, go also most of the U.S. Government workers who, for 3 years and 9 months, guided the program that changed not only the face of a continent but its whole state of mind.

These workers, totaling only 2,400 in the Washington headquarters and in 25 missions around the world, are credited with spending the largest sum in history on such reconstruction efforts at an administrative cost of less than a third of a cent per dollar. It has been said that "never in human history has so much been spent by so few with such great results." This has been accomplished without "hint of graft or cloud of scandal."

The recovery of Europe from the chaos of 1947, when it was hungry, cold, disorderly, and frightened, can be measured in cold statistics: Industrial production, 64 percent above 1947 and 41 percent above prewar; steel production, nearly doubled in less than 4 years; coal production, slightly below prewar but still 27 percent higher than in 1947; aluminum, copper, and cement production, up respectively 69, 31, and 90 percent from 1947; food production, 24 percent above 1947 and 9 percent above prewar levels.

But the best illustration of the recovery of Europe is the fact that she is now able—even though with great sacrifice—to shoulder part of the heavy burden of rearmament.

And while production figures are impressive, the long-range benefits of what has been called "one

of the most significant demonstrations of international cooperation in peacetime history" lie beyond these, according to Acting ECA Administrator Richard M. Bissell, Jr. Now Deputy Director for Mutual Security under W. Averell Harriman, Bissell becomes operating head of the new MSA, charged not only with economic assistance to the European rearmament program, but also with continuing the program of U.S. economic and technical assistance to Asia.

"When future historians look back upon the achievements of the Marshall Plan," Bissell said, "I believe they will see in it the charge that blasted the first substantial cracks in the centuries-old walls of European nationalism—walls that once destroyed will clear the way for the building of a unified, prosperous, and, above all, peaceful continent."

Effects of the Plan on European Nationalism

The first of these substantial cracks in the walls of European nationalism resulted directly from the "self-help" proviso tied to the offer of American aid in the famed June 5, 1947, address at Harvard University by the then Secretary of State, Gen. George C. Marshall.

Before the U.S. could proceed much further in helping to start Europe on its way to recovery, General Marshall said, "there must be some agreement among the countries of Europe as to the requirements of the situation and the part those countries themselves will take. . . . The initiative . . . must come from Europe."

That initiative took the form of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). For the first time in history, governments of 18 free nations of Europe banded together to work out common solutions to common economic problems and make the best possible use of American aid. Thanks largely to the efforts of the OEEC, some 75 percent of the restrictions which formerly hampered the free movement of goods between countries of Europe have now been removed, and the volume of intra-European trade is now virtually double what it was in 1947.

Out of the OEEC, too, developed the second substantial crack in the barriers to unification, the European Payments Union (EPU), a general

clearinghouse for the varied currencies of Europe that is helping overcome payments difficulties which stood in the way of a free development of trade between nations.

Primed with U.S. dollar aid, EPU has weathered several crises in its first year and a half and has given Europe its first major plunge into the challenging task of economic integration.

The second major step toward economic integration, now almost virtually assured, lies in the dramatic Schuman Plan to fuse the six major continental steel and coal-producing countries into a single market area. Under it, member governments will voluntarily relinquish their sovereign rights to interfere with the production and distribution of steel and coal within their borders, delegating those rights to a supra-national authority.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), made possible through the ties of friendship knit during the first years of the Marshall Plan, is another move toward solidifying Europe.

Finally, in the creation of a single European Army under Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower's command, the nations of free Europe may take still another in the series of steps toward unity that could only be classed as a dream before the impetus that was provided in the Marshall Plan.

A Survey of Achievements

The Economic Cooperation Administration has expended nearly 12 billion dollars in grants and loans in carrying out the European Recovery Program—equal to nearly 80 dollars for every man, woman, and child in the United States. To this, the countries of Europe have added the equivalent of another 9 billion dollars in its own currencies to match the American grant-aid dollars. Of the U.S. funds, about 5.5 billion dollars have been used to purchase industrial commodities, mostly from the United States, and another 5.2 billion dollars for the purchase of food and other agricultural commodities such as cotton. Over 800 million dollars has alone gone into the cost of ocean freight for goods sent to Europe. The U.S. contribution to the setting up of the EPU was 350 million dollars and another 100 million dollars has been used since then to help the payments union over rough spots.

In their turn, the Marshall Plan countries in the past 3 years completed or are pushing to completion a total of 27 major projects for the increase of power and 32 major projects for modernizing and expanding the production of iron and steel. Major petroleum refining works number 11 and the volume of refining has quadrupled over prewar. Other industrial projects costing the equivalent of a million dollars or more bring the total of such projects to 132, costing the equivalent of over two billion dollars. About half a billion dollars of the U.S. commodity and technical aid has gone into these projects.

Into other major recovery projects have gone also the equivalent of billions of dollars of the counterpart currencies generated in the Marshall Plan countries to match American dollar aid. Such counterpart funds are used by the respective countries for recovery projects approved by the ECA. Biggest single use—equivalent to more than a billion dollars—has been for the improvement of electric, gas, and power facilities, an improvement that is helping to make possible Europe's rearmament program today.

Similarly vital to Europe's defenses has been the rehabilitation of the continent's run-down and war-smashed railway network, with approved projects for use of counterpart funds totaling more than the equivalent of half a billion dollars. Similarly, counterpart projects for the reconstruction of merchant fleets, port and shipping facilities, and inland waterways have been completed or are in the process of completion in the Marshall Plan countries. Airports, too, have been built or improved with ECA-generated local currencies.

Through such double-barreled use of dollar aid and local funds, Marshall Plan nations, in less than 4 years, have rebuilt their economies to a point that could well persuade the Kremlin that the Europe which looked like such easy pickings in 1946 and 1947 is indeed a formidable bastion today.

Steel production, for example, so necessary to a strong peace or war economy, has risen from less than 31 million tons in 1947 to nearly 60 million tons in 1951. Soviet Russia and her satellites combined have a steel production rate of about 35 million tons.

The average volume of crude oil refined in Europe in prewar years was 12 million tons annually. In 1950-51 the volume of refined products reached 46.8 million tons, or nearly four times prewar.

In 1947, Europe's average monthly electrical production was 13½ million kilowatt hours. In mid-1951 the wheels of Europe's industry were being turned with 20½ million kilowatt hours per month. From a monthly cement production average of less than 2 million metric tons in 1947, Europe's production rose to 4 million tons monthly during the first half of 1951.

Cotton-yarn production in free Europe has risen from a monthly average of 82,000 metric tons in 1947 to 125,000 tons in 1951; wool yarn production is up from 33,000 tons monthly in 1947 to 44,000 tons in 1951.

One of the most dramatic improvements, and one closely tied to Europe's defense capabilities, is in the production of motor vehicles. Monthly production, running at the rate of 54,000 vehicles in 1947, is up to 145,000 vehicles in 1951.

Agricultural production is up 9 percent over prewar and 24 percent over 1947-48, but at the same time there are many more mouths to feed (population is up from 250 million in 1938 to over

275 million in 1951) and Europe is not yet self-sufficient in food production.

Overall, Europe's gross national product—the total sum of its production of goods and services—rose by nearly 25 percent in the less than 4 years of Marshall Plan aid to over 125 billion dollars in 1950. This is a 15 percent increase over prewar levels.

But Europe by no means considers its job finished. Member countries of the OEEC recently issued a manifesto declaring their intention to work for an expansion of total production in Western Europe by 25 percent over the next 5 years.

With her industrial plant rebuilt to better than prewar years, Europe's hope for meeting or surpassing this goal must rest on improved production methods and greater productivity—increased output of goods with the same amount of manpower, machines, and management.

Because it is in this field in particular that the United States far outstrips the rest of the world, it is in this field assistance to Europe is now being concentrated, and that priority aid will continue to be given to Free Europe through the Mutual Security Agency.

Under the productivity and technical-assistance program of ECA, more than 6 thousand representatives of European industries—management, technicians, and workers—have come to the United States for varied periods of intensive studies of U.S. production methods. Nearly 5 thousand American industrial plants and organizations have thrown open their doors to these visitors and given freely of their techniques in everything from plant layout to labor-management relations.

Last month, nearly 300 of Europe's top industrialists—owners or managers of European industries worth nearly 7 billion dollars—came to this country for a study of the "climate" and the attitudes of American management and American labor that have made the United States the world's production leader.

One major key to that high production rate is the theory of "shared-out productivity"—the distribution of the benefits of increased production efficiency to the consumer, in the form of lower prices; to the worker, in the form of higher wages, and to management in the form of adequate profits.

Mutual Security Agency To Continue Field Assistance to Europe

To help bring that key element to the industries of Free Europe, ECA has laid the groundwork for—and the Mutual Security Agency will carry out—a program for providing U.S. technical assistance at the plant and industry level in Europe itself and for the sharing of productivity knowledge and experience among Europe's industries on a continent-wide basis.

Through this concentration on productivity—and particularly on the widest possible sharing of its benefits—the MSA will continue where the Marshall Plan leaves off in the ideological battle against the snares of communism.

While it is still a potent force in some key areas of Europe, the expansion of communism in Western Europe has been abruptly halted and the tide sharply turned back in the years of the Marshall Plan. In country after country, free elections have seen the Communist Party overwhelmed almost to the point of extinction. In France and Italy, while Communist-dominated unions still hold the biggest bloc of workers, their membership losses have been staggering. In France, it is estimated that the powerful CGT has lost from half a million to three million members. In Italy, the Communist-dominated CGIL has lost about 2½ million members.

While the growth of free trade-unions has not matched the losses in the Red-dominated unions, the declining strength of communism is evidenced in the failure, despite concentrated efforts, to close the ports of France and Italy to arms-aid shipments from the United States.

There are still many dark spots in Europe's economic picture. Darkest of all is the widening dollar gap brought on by the inflationary pressures of the free world's rearmament effort. It is a dollar gap that makes mandatory continued economic aid to Europe through the burdensome period of rearmament. But the free world's leaders are convinced that the economic and moral foundation rebuilt by Europe in the past 4 years with the help of the American people through the Marshall Plan will hold firm.

The vision of a new Europe, economically strong, unified as it had never been before, standing resolutely in the ranks of the free countries of the world, has become a fact.

Tomorrow, that chapter of American history which made this possible—the Marshall Plan—is finished. Heavily criticized by some; labeled "the give-away program" by many, it has had the continuous support of the Congress, industry, labor, and nearly every other segment of American life.

To them, the American people who have supported it, belongs whatever verdict is handed down by the unbiased eyes of future history.

WESTERN GERMANY'S PROGRESS UNDER MARSHALL PLAN

by John J. McCloy
*U.S. High Commissioner for Germany*¹

A review of developments in Western Germany covering the past 4 years strikingly shows that the great objectives of the Marshall Plan have been largely accomplished.

¹ Statement made over NBC television on Jan. 6 and released to the press on the same date.

A very few years ago Western Germany was broken, chaotic, and near starvation.

The transformation which has occurred since then might almost be called a miracle. With Marshall Plan help, West Germany has largely re-established itself as a solid, productive country. Its production has increased from 1947 three-fold until it has become the second largest industrial producing country in Western Europe. Despite the fact that Western Germany borders Soviet controlled areas, communism has been definitely blocked.

Germany has likewise made tremendous strides in the production of food, despite the loss of the rich East German farm lands. The influx of 10,000,000 refugees seriously aggravated the food shortage and seriously intensified the grave housing problem, for so much of Germany's housing was lost during the war. Western Germany's record of rebuilding is phenomenal, yet in some sections people are still living five or six to a room. One house in every five built since 1948 has received Marshall Plan aid.

Economic problems of a large order still persist. These must be solved and the economic gains must be consolidated to establish a firm front against Soviet pressure—pressure which is probably greater here than anywhere else in Europe. We must continue to promote an expanding economy capable of sustaining the defense burden. To this end, the Mutual Security Agency, successor to the Economic Cooperation Administration, is designed to help build for defense. To a large extent, the staff used by ECA will be used to carry forward these aims. Western Germany still heavily depends upon outside areas for much of its raw materials and some 40 percent of its food supplies. This requires an ever-active industry and markets if the country is to maintain an economic—and in the long run a political—balance. But the German people are hardworking and imaginative. Moreover they see now what they failed to see for a long period after the close of the war—a glimpse of hope. Others can help, but the chief aid must come from within.

In Germany this economic progress is reflected in political progress for they are related. A freely elected parliament has been functioning for over 2 years, the German Government is a respected active force in international meetings, and the press and people are free. Although the Federal Republic is not yet a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it is working on plans to make an appropriate defense contribution and to participate in the European defense community. In the face of incessant opposition from the East, the question here is no longer so much whether Germany should participate in a Western defense system but rather what should be the form and extent of her participation.

As for the extent of true democratic progress in Germany, I think we can also take some satis-

faction. I have said that reactionary forces from the extreme right have also been blocked but some are still about, and one day they may again make their bid for power. I doubt that they will again prevail—they certainly will not if Germany becomes, as I believe she will, definitely aligned with the democracies of the West. The habit of democracy in Germany may not yet be ingrained, but it is growing.

In short, on the basis of the economic and political progress already made, I feel one can have real faith that a satisfactory way will be found to meet the complex and heavy problems that lie ahead of the German Federal Republic and that it will develop into a constructive and reliable force for democracy in this part of the world.

Secretary Acheson Views Soviet Proposal on Korean Negotiations

When asked at his news conference on January 4 to comment on Andrei Y. Vyshinsky's proposal to break the Korean peace-truce deadlock, Secretary Acheson said that we had to start off by looking at what Mr. Vyshinsky proposed. He noted that the first thing Mr. Vyshinsky proposed was to undo one very important thing which had already been done by the General Assembly, the setting up of the Collective Measures Committee. Secretary Acheson said Mr. Vyshinsky's proposal that the Security Council be called in order to "break the deadlock in Korea" calls for a look at past actions. He pointed out that Mr. Vyshinsky's colleague, Mr. Malik, in August 1950 had produced such a deadlock as had never been seen before in the whole United Nations.¹ Secretary Acheson said that this was not a very promising proposal, stating that the discussions in Korea on the armistice had gone forward over a long time slowly but with definite progress. The Secretary went on to say that the discussions were being conducted admirably by General Ridgway and his associates and he could not see how the conduct of this matter could be improved by being transferred elsewhere. He said that it could only be delayed and hampered. Secretary Acheson said that he felt that specific parts of what Mr. Vyshinsky proposed were nothing short of disastrous.

Secretary Acheson went on to say that as far as a general meeting to relieve tensions was concerned, we had had a meeting of 17 weeks early last year in Paris to try to arrange the very thing that Mr. Vyshinsky wanted to bring about and the Russian delegate, Mr. Gromyko, had done

¹Yakov Malik, Soviet representative in the Security Council, served as president of the Council during August 1950. For statements concerning his tactics as presiding officer, see BULLETIN of Aug. 21, 1950, p. 283; Aug. 28, 1950, p. 326; and Sept. 18, 1950, pp. 451 and 455.

everything in his power to obstruct and frustrate that meeting. Secretary Acheson said he felt that one had to conclude that Mr. Vyshinsky, by holding out some bait—a meeting to relieve tensions—was really attempting to utterly destroy the two things which were going forward satisfactorily, the Collective Measures Committee and negotiations in Korea. He said we would vote against this proposal for the reasons he had just given.

Text of Soviet Proposal

Following is the text of the Soviet proposal as introduced in Committee I (Political and Security) of the General Assembly on January 3 by Andrei Y. Vyshinsky:

U.N. doc. A/C.1/688
Dated January 3, 1952.

CONSIDERING that a basic task of the United Nations is to secure and strengthen international peace and security, and bearing in mind that under the Charter the main responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security has been conferred on the Security Council,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

1. *Decides* to abolish the Collective Measures Committee,

2. *Recommends* the Security Council:
in accordance with Article 28 of the Charter, to convene without delay a periodic meeting to consider what measures might ensure the removal of the tension at present existing in international relations and the establishment of friendly relations between countries;

to examine at a periodic meeting in the first place the measures which the Security Council should take to help to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations being held in Korea for the cessation of hostilities.

Military Assistance Agreement With Brazil

[Released to the press January 3]

The Departments of State and Defense announced on January 3 the initiation of the first bilateral negotiations under the program of military-grant aid for Latin America, authorized in the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

Conversations will begin on January 3 in Rio de Janeiro between representatives of the Governments of Brazil and the United States looking to the conclusion of a bilateral military assistance agreement. This agreement would involve the provision of grant aid by the United States to promote the defense of the Western Hemisphere.

The American Ambassador in Rio de Janeiro, Herschel V. Johnson, will be assisted in the negotiations by representatives of the Department of Defense. It is anticipated that similar conversations will be held with the governments of several other American Republics. Announcements will be made as arrangements for their initiation are completed.

Cotton Credit for Spain

Credits of up to 12 million dollars for financing the purchase and shipment of U.S. cotton to Spain were announced by the Export-Import Bank on January 4.

The credits are to be established in favor of Spanish commercial banks with the guaranty of the Bank of Spain and the Instituto Español de Moneda Extranjera. They will bear interest at 2¾ percent per annum and be repayable in 18 months and will be available until June 30, 1952, for financing U.S. cotton contracted for and shipped as from the date of establishment of the credits.

The details regarding the operations and procedures under the credits will be announced as soon as they are completed.

U.S., India Expand Point Four Program

[Released to the press January 5]

American assistance under an expanded Point Four Program for speeding up the economic development of India will be made available under an agreement signed on January 5 in New Delhi between India and the United States. The agreement was signed at 4 p.m. New Delhi time (5:30 a.m. Washington time). The Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, and the United States Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, signed on behalf of their respective Governments.

Under the agreement, the United States will make available 50 million dollars during the current fiscal year, ending June 30, 1952, to be deposited in a special Indo-American Technical Cooperation Fund. The Government of India has agreed to contribute rupees for the projects to be financed out of this Fund. It is estimated that this will result in at least a total amount for the program of rupees 50 crore, which in terms of dollars is the equivalent of 100 million dollars.

The projects to be financed by this Fund will be administered in close cooperation with the central and state Governments. Projects under the Fund will be aimed primarily at raising the level of agricultural production and increasing the food supply of the country, to help reduce India's present dependence on food imports. These imports now average about 5 million tons a year and cost the country about 500 million dollars in foreign exchange, which otherwise could be used for economic development.

Of major importance is the community-development program which has been tentatively agreed upon between the two Governments for financing

out of this Fund. This program contemplates the setting up of about 50 rural-urban development areas in different parts of the country, each consisting of about 200,000 people in about 300 villages. Many of these areas may be selected around the new river-valley projects. Others will be around the new tube well-development projects to be financed by the Fund and also by the central and state Governments in India.

The proposed rural-urban development program is expected to draw upon the combined experience of the Uttar Pradesh Government at the Etawah development project and the newly built townships for displaced persons at Faridabad and Nilokheri. At Etawah, in 3 years time, 79,000 people from 102 villages, covering an area of 100 square miles, have demonstrated how, with cooperative and planned endeavor, food production can be substantially increased. They have also been successful in eliminating, to a large extent, malaria, rinderpest, and other diseases, and in greatly improving literacy. In Faridabad and Nilokheri again, in less than 3 years, good planning and enthusiastic cooperation of the people have enabled modern townships to be built with up-to-date housing, good schools, improved health facilities, and a wide variety of industrial opportunities.

The agreement provides for the formation of an independent central committee of the Indian Government which will determine their policies and provide general supervision of the projects undertaken. Members of the committee will be appointed by the Government of India. Clifford Willson, representing the Technical Cooperation Administration of the U. S. Department of State in India, will be available as consultant to this committee.

The Indo-American Technical Cooperation Fund, in which the American funds will be deposited, will be administered jointly. An officer of the Central Ministry of Finance will be the nominee of the Government of India for this purpose, while Clifford Willson, working under the general supervision of the United States Ambassador in India, will be the nominee of the United States Government. As projects of economic development are approved by the joint administrators, the United States will deposit the required dollars in the Fund.

The new agreement is a supplement to the general Point Four Agreement which was signed between the Governments of the United States and India on December 28, 1950.¹ The agreement represents a considerable expansion of the Point Four Program in India, as provided for in the Mutual Security Act of 1951. In fiscal year 1951, about 711,000 dollars were obligated for expenditure in India on technical-cooperation projects in

agriculture, industrial development, education, public health, rural improvement, mineral and hydro-electric development, handicrafts, and laboratory investigations.

Thus far in fiscal year 1952, approximately 1,500,000 dollars has been allocated for similar work. Of the existing allocations, 185,000 dollars is for training of 48 Indian nationals in the United States in these and related fields. As much as 2,500,000 dollars additional may be expended by the United States in fiscal year 1952 for employment of American technicians in India, making a total of about 4 million dollars available for projects in addition to the joint Fund.

Members of the American negotiating team which helped work out the agreement, besides Mr. Willson, are:

John A. Loftus, economic adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, who is serving the negotiating group as principal economic adviser

John P. Ferris, Chief of Regional Planning Development Studies Branch of the Tennessee Valley Authority, serving as valley development expert

Horace Holmes, widely known chief of Point Four agricultural activities in India, advising the negotiators in his field

Frank W. Parker, expert in soils and agronomy, U.S. Department of Agriculture, advising on fertilizer production and usage

Willis Rich, former Chief of Scientific Inquiry, Bureau of Fisheries, U.S. Department of the Interior; and chief fisheries expert, SCAP, Japan, advising on fisheries

Dr. Estelle Ford Warner, Medical Director, U.S. Public Health Service, with the rank of colonel, advising on public health matters

Mr. Willson, who has the personal rank of minister, was appointed November 29, 1951, to direct the whole Point Four Program in India in consultation with Ambassador Bowles. He has been in charge of planning the Colorado River Great Basin development for the Department of the Interior. He recently returned as ECA settlement adviser to the Government of Turkey in settling 120,000 Turkish refugees from Bulgaria.

U.S. Ships Wheat to Jordan

[Released to the press December 18]

The United States is to supply 9,650 long tons of wheat to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to help that country cope with a serious food shortage caused by failure of the wheat crop, the Department of State announced on December 18.

An agreement between the Governments of the United States and Jordan to cover the terms of the wheat grant was signed in Amman on that date. A general agreement for technical cooperation between Jordan and the United States has been in effect since February 27, 1951.

Ordinarily, Jordan is self-sufficient in wheat

¹ BULLETIN of Jan. 8, 1951, p. 67.

production and is able to export small amounts. Wheat is the main crop of this predominantly agricultural economy.

The wheat shipment will cost about \$1,400,000 including transportation. It is being financed under the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as a part of the program of technical cooperation and economic assistance in the Near East. The Government of Jordan will sell the wheat through commercial channels. The proceeds will provide local currency (Jordan dinars) with which that Government will share the expenses of Point Four development projects in agriculture, health, education, water resources, and small-scale industries.

The wheat is being supplied by the Commodity Credit Corporation from its stocks in inventory. It will be loaded at Baltimore on or about December 26 aboard the S. S. *Sky Star*.

Convention on Declaration of Death of Missing Persons

Following the receipt of an instrument of accession by Guatemala, the convention on the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons will come into force on January 24, 1952, the Secretary-General of the United Nations announced on December 27.

Formal receipt of the Guatemalan notification is dated Christmas Day, December 25, and, according to the convention's provisions, it will come into force 30 days following deposit of the second instrument of accession. The first, by China, was made on December 20, 1950.

The convention on the Declaration of Death of Missing Persons was drafted by an international conference of plenipotentiaries convened by the General Assembly in the spring of 1950 and opened for accession on April 6, 1950. It stemmed directly from international concern over the disappearance of millions of persons, without any evidence of their death, after the Second World War—mostly because of deportations, concentration camps, and other methods of extermination practiced by the Nazis.

Lack of certainty as to whether they did die and, if so, on what date, has led to legal complications, particularly in cases of remarriage and inheritance. The convention, prepared by representatives of 26 governments, applies to persons whose last known residence was in Europe, Asia, or Africa, and who disappeared between 1939 and 1945 under circumstances which give reasonable

ground to infer that they have died because of the war or because of racial, religious, political, or national persecution. It will also be applicable to persons missing since 1945 in similar circumstances but only in those contracting states which notify the Secretary-General that they agree to this provision.

The convention accords competence to declare a person dead to courts at the missing person's last known residence (whether forced or voluntary), at the place of supposed death of the country of which the missing person was a national and of the country where his property is located. The date of death is to be fixed as the date of disappearance defined as that of the last known indication of the person's existence.

The convention set up an International Bureau for Declarations of Death to serve as an international clearinghouse of information, and to enable tribunals of different states to exchange information. Though not yet established, the Bureau cost is provided for in the current U.N. budget estimates.

Letter of Credence

India

The newly appointed Ambassador of India, Binay Ranjan Sen, presented his credentials to the President on December 19, 1951. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and for the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 1100 of December 19.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Dec. 29, 1951-Jan. 5, 1952

Releases may be obtained from the Office of the Special Assistant for Press Relations, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Items marked (*) are not printed in the BULLETIN; items marked (†) will appear in a future issue.

| No. | Date | Subject |
|-------|-------|-------------------------------------|
| 1098 | 12/18 | Wheat to Jordan |
| 1100 | 12/19 | India: Letter of credence (rewrite) |
| 1123† | 12/29 | New Tca administrator |
| 1* | 1/2 | Visitors to U.S. |
| 2* | 1/2 | Anniversary of Haiti |
| 3† | 1/2 | Information Services merged in U.K. |
| 4 | 1/3 | Military assistance to Brazil |
| 5 | 1/3 | U.S. Delegation to Who |
| 6* | 1/5 | Anniversary of Burma |
| 7† | 1/5 | Voa programs for U.S. public |
| 8 | 1/5 | McCloy: Marshall Plan in Germany |
| 9 | 1/5 | U.S.-India Point 4 expanded |

Plans for Liquidation of IRO

REPORT ON SESSIONS HELD AT GENEVA, OCTOBER 18-27, 1951

by George L. Warren

The General Council of the International Refugee Organization (IRO) held its eighth session at Geneva from October 22 through October 27, 1951. The Executive Committee met concurrently from October 18 through October 26, 1951.

The General Council received from the Executive Committee comments on the annual report of the Director General for the year ending June 30, 1951, the financial statements and the report of the auditors for the same period, the status of contributions, the revised plan of expenditures for the supplementary and closure periods beginning July 1, 1950, a report on plans for the termination of operations, and a statement by the Director General on residual problems anticipated to exist after the termination of IRO.

The Director General, in his report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1951, referred to the liberalization of the immigration criteria of reception countries which had provided resettlement opportunities for 70 thousand additional refugees who would not have been able to move under criteria previously in force. He indicated that considerable progress had been made in arranging facilities for refugees and their dependents who require continual institutional care and treatment. Only 7,104 refugees in this group remained the concern of the Organization on June 30, 1951. By September 30, 1951, this number had been reduced to 2,564. Only 477 remained for whom no satisfactory arrangements had been completed as of that date. Of the 111 thousand refugees for whom responsibility had been transferred to the govern-

ments and authorities of Western Europe, Germany, and Austria on July 1, 1951, many had been resettled overseas in the intervening period.

A recent important development in the experience of the Organization had been the use of the Organization for the movement on a full-cost reimbursable basis of migrants of different nationalities ineligible for Iro services, thus permitting more flexibility in the movement of refugees and economy in the use of ships than would have been possible otherwise. The report also indicated that 166,985 refugees had been resettled during the year under review and 2,169 repatriated, bringing the total of refugees resettled by the Organization up to June 30, 1951, to 955,141, and the number repatriated to 72,423. Resettlement operations during the third quarter of the calendar year 1951 enabled the members of the Council to participate at Geneva during the session in ceremonies commemorating the movement of the one millionth refugee and his family. The Netherlands Government announced at the session that in response to the personal wishes of Queen Juliana, the Netherlands Government would grant admission to an additional 100 to 200 refugees remaining under the care of Iro who require continual custodial care.

Financial Position

The financial statements, considered and accepted by the council, showed that the resources available to the Organization during the year

ending June 30, 1951, totaled \$105,015,393, including stocks on hand on July 1, 1951, valued at \$6,774,447. During that period \$71,173,122 in cash resources had been utilized and inventory values were reduced by \$3,550,362, leaving a net of \$30,291,909 in available resources as of July 1, 1951. Miscellaneous income anticipated during the remaining period of operations and contributions due but not received brought the total resources available for use in the period after June 30, 1951 to \$31,072,474, of which \$27,848,389 were in the form of liquid assets.

The council also learned that two important items of receivable assets still under negotiation were not included in the foregoing figures. The first was a credit balance due the Organization on the food replacement account in Germany, amounting to an estimated \$5,311,395, and the second was a claim against the Government of Australia for \$1,651,060 arising out of the costs of moving refugees to Australia. To the extent that any part of the sums involved in these two items under negotiation become available to the Organization, it was considered possible that resettlement operations might be continued during January 1952 and that arrangements might be made for additional refugees and their dependents who require continual institutional care and who might otherwise be left without assistance upon the termination of the Organization.

After close examination of the financial statements and the auditors' report, the council concluded that the financial position of the Organization was satisfactory in that, with the exception of the German food credit and the Australian claim, all assets would be realized in the intervening period before closure and all liabilities would be satisfactorily settled in the same period.

Plans for Liquidation of IRO

The council, after full consideration, approved the revised plan of expenditure of the supplementary and closure periods beginning July 1, 1950. As against the total amount of \$100,356,962 approved by the council at its previous session, the revised plan proposed the expenditure of \$99,021,511, of which \$5,198,503 was allocated to the administrative budget, \$92,633,008 to the operational budget, and the remaining \$1,190,000 to the closure budget. The revised plan was based on the use of all income which could reasonably be anticipated before the end of the calendar year 1951, and depended especially upon the continuation of favorable factors affecting the shipping program. In the event of failure of any of the income to materialize, the program would have to be curtailed. The plan provided for the resettlement of a total of 231,400 refugees in the period subsequent to July 1, 1950, 9 thousand more than the number estimated in the earlier plan of expenditure. It was noted, however, that unless the

German food credit account and the Australian claim are settled satisfactorily, some 12 thousand refugees expected to receive visas for the United States and other countries will remain in Europe after January 1, 1952, without the possibility of transport. Dependent on these items also is a more satisfactory disposition of the remaining refugees in Shanghai, in the Philippines, in Trieste, and in Greece and Italy.

The council tentatively approved plans for the final liquidation of the Organization which will be reconsidered at a final meeting of the council in late January 1952. These plans call for the liquidation of all of the affairs of the Organization during a 6-month period starting immediately after the date of cessation of operations. At the cessation of operations the estimated staff will total 650, of which 175 will constitute the liquidation staff. Two weeks after the cessation of operations the staff will be reduced to 175 persons and after an additional two weeks to 127 persons. The cost of liquidation, excluding an amount of \$440,000 for final payments to personnel, is estimated at \$750,000.

Residual Refugee Problems

The General Assembly of the United Nations, at its fifth session, had invited the General Council of the Iro (Resolution No. 430 (V) December 14, 1950) to submit a communication on the problem of assistance to refugees remaining uncared for upon the termination of Iro. The drafting of this communication was one of the most important actions of the council at its eighth session. The council decided to transmit to the General Assembly a factual communication describing the residual problems of refugees previously eligible for Iro assistance as distinguished from recommendations to the General Assembly for the solution of these problems. None of the governments represented on the council were prepared to present their views as to the actions which the United Nations might take on the basis of the Iro communication. The communication transmitted (U.N. document A/1948, November 10, 1951) indicated that the Iro had sufficient funds to continue operations until January 1, 1952, and possibly to assist and reestablish several thousand additional refugees during January and February 1952; that the Organization had already repatriated and resettled over 1,000,000 refugees; and that it had made reasonably satisfactory provision for approximately 47 thousand refugees, including their dependents who require continuing custodial care. There will remain, however, in certain areas such as Shanghai, the Philippines, Trieste, Greece, and Italy, limited numbers of refugees whose problems will not have been satisfactorily resolved for economic, political, and other reasons.

The following 15 member governments of IRO were represented at this session of the council:

| | |
|--------------------|----------------|
| Australia | Netherlands |
| Belgium | New Zealand |
| Canada | Norway |
| Denmark | Switzerland |
| Dominican Republic | United Kingdom |
| France | United States |
| Italy | Venezuela |
| Luxembourg | |

The Governments of China, Guatemala, and Iceland, members of the Organization, were not represented. The Governments of Austria, Brazil, Germany, Israel, Mexico, and Sweden, as well as the Holy See, the United Nations, and the International Labor Organization were represented by

observers. The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees was also present as an observer.

F. Leemans of Belgium presided as chairman of the council for the session, N. St. C. Deschamps of Australia served as first vice chairman, J. Sturm of Luxembourg as second vice chairman, and P. J. de Kanter of the Netherlands as *rapporteur*. The council adjourned on October 27, 1951, having decided to reconvene at Geneva for its final session late in January 1952. The Executive Committee will reconvene a few days prior to the meeting of the General Council in January.

• *Mr. Warren, author of the above article, is Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State. Mr. Warren was U.S. representative to the October sessions of the IRO.*

Demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir

SECOND REPORT BY THE U.N. REPRESENTATIVE FOR INDIA AND PAKISTAN

On December 18, Frank P. Graham, U.N. representative for India and Pakistan, transmitted to the Secretary-General his second report to the Security Council (U.N. doc. S/2448).¹ As a result of private negotiations with representatives of India and Pakistan, Dr. Graham reported that he had been successful in enlarging the area of agreement on steps leading toward the holding of a plebiscite in the disputed state. Agreement still has not been reached on four basic points of the compromise plan prepared by Dr. Graham.

Parts I and II of the second report outline the terms of reference given by the Security Council to the U.N. representative and the procedure which he adopted in continuing his negotiations. Following is the text of the remainder of the report:

EDITOR'S NOTE. On Nov. 10, 1951, the Security Council instructed Dr. Graham to continue his efforts to obtain agreement on a plan for demilitarizing the State of Jammu and Kashmir along the lines indicated in his report of Oct. 15.

¹ For excerpts from Dr. Graham's Oct. 15 report and from his statement to the Security Council on Oct. 18, see *BULLETIN* of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 738. For a statement on Dr. Graham's mission by Amb. Ernest A. Gross, see *BULLETIN* of Dec. 10, 1951, p. 958, and for the Security Council's resolution of Nov. 10, see *ibid.*, p. 959.

U.N. doc. S/2448
Dated December 19, 1951
[Excerpts]

III

Points of Difference Between the Two Governments

The points of difference of the two Governments in regard to their interpretation and execution of the resolutions of the UNCIP of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 remain on the fundamental issues as they appear in the first report of the United Nations Representative.

Concerning the points of difference between the Governments on the proposals of the United Nations Representative of 7 September 1951, the conversations held by the United Nations Representative with the parties, as well as the answers he has received to the different questions put to them by him, have convinced him that at this stage of the negotiations the parties could not achieve agreement on the draft agreement as a whole, submitted to them by the United Nations Representative on 7 September 1951.

As explained above, the United Nations Representative concentrated his efforts on what in his opinion constituted the two fundamental points of difference between the parties with regard to his proposals for agreement, namely,

(a) The minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, and

(b) The day on which the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office.

Minimum of Forces

In his statement to the parties of 7 December 1951² the United Nations Representative pointed out that,

² Annex III, not here printed.

"The number of armed forces to remain at the end of the period of demilitarization should be decisively reduced to the smallest number possible for the final disposal by the Plebiscite Administrator."

In the questionnaires submitted to the parties,² the United Nations Representative had in mind that the Government of India had repeatedly stated that the Government of India was responsible for the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and security could not be made dependent solely on assurances offered, but must be related to the actual conditions prevailing in the area. The United Nations Representative also took into account the fact that in August 1951 the Government of India, in answering a question submitted by the United Nations Representative, had said,

"The expression 'security of the State' referred to in question 9 is intended to connote the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir against incursion of tribesmen, Pakistan nationals and regular Pakistan forces whether acting separately or in concert".

In its answer to the questionnaire the Government of India said³ (paragraph 7),

"It should be noticed that the Indian troops remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir at the end of the period of demilitarization under this plan are over 7,000 less than the minimum stated in paragraph 8 of the Prime Minister's letter of September 11th."

Furthermore, in paragraph 8 of its answer to the questionnaire, the Government of India said:

"The quantum of troops proposed in paragraph 5 above should be compared with the force of about a dozen battalions of infantry plus artillery, cavalry and other protective forces which were maintained by the State of Jammu and Kashmir before the partition of India, when the borders of the State were secured against any external threat by the presence of large garrisons in British India at all the strategic approaches to the State, and when conditions of comparative peace and security prevailed on the sub-continent and in the neighbouring countries. Not only has the State since suffered two invasions, but on some of its frontiers extremely unsettled conditions still prevail. These factors must inevitably influence the strength of the forces now required for its security. It should also be pointed out that any appreciation affecting the security of the territory and the strength of the forces required to ensure it, must remain the responsibility of the Government of India."

The Government of Pakistan maintains that,

"... a force of no more than 4 infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) should be left on each side of the ceasefire line. The Pakistan Government are, however, prepared to agree that so long as the forces on each side of the ceasefire line are of the order indicated above, some slight difference in the strength or description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached."

During the discussions at the military level information received indicated that at some stage of the tentative plan of demilitarization the withdrawals of armed forces would amount to a great proportion compared with those that were there on 1 January 1949. However, the disparity between the number and character of the forces proposed by the parties to be left at the end of the period of demilitarization were so wide that any agreement on the whole plan concerned as a single continuous process could not be reached at this stage.

Appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator

The opinions of the Governments of India and Pakistan concerning the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator were so irreconcilable that the United Nations Representative could not see the possibility of obtaining an agreement at this stage.

The Indian Government insisted that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed as soon as conditions in the State, on both sides of the cease-fire line permitted of a start being made with the arrangements for carrying out the plebiscite, and that to appoint the Plebiscite Administrator before he could function effectively would be premature. On the other hand, the Government of Pakistan emphasized the importance of appointing the Plebiscite Administrator formally to office as much in advance of the final day of demilitarization as possible.

IV

Views of the United Nations Representative Concerning the Problem Confided to Him

The United Nations Representative has endeavoured in the preceding part of his report to present to the Security Council a summary of his efforts to implement the resolution of the Council of 10 November 1951.

In the report to the Security Council dated 15 October 1951 the United Nations Representative reported that the two Governments had indicated agreement on four of the twelve proposals for an integrated plan of demilitarization submitted to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan on 7 September 1951.

The four proposals on which agreement had been reached were paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4.⁴

The United Nations Representative can now report agreement on four more proposals, namely, paragraphs 8, 9, 11 and 12.⁵

The representative of India agreed to accept paragraph 12 of the draft agreement on the understanding that the reference made there was not to differences arising in the process of drawing up a programme of demilitarization, but only to differences upon technical details concerning the actual implementation of the agreed programme. The United Nations Representative agreed with this interpretation of paragraph 12.

Agreement has not been reached on the four most basic proposals of the twelve, namely, paragraph 5, 6, 7 and 10. Agreement on these four paragraphs is most essential for carrying out the plan of demilitarization envisaged as an integrated whole in the twelve proposals.

The four basic proposals on which agreement between the parties has not been reached are as follows:

"5. Agree that subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 below the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a single, continuous process;

"6. Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be completed during a period of 90 days, unless another period is decided upon by the representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments referred to in paragraph 9 below;

"7. Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State, and

(iii) large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place.

B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State Armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B (1) above will have been carried out;

² Annex VI, not here printed.

⁴ BULLETIN of Nov. 5, 1951, p. 740.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 741.

so that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the cease-fire line a force of — Civil Armed Forces, and on the Indian side of the cease-fire line a force of —.

"10. Agree that the Government of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period referred to in paragraph 6 above;"

The United Nations Representative has carefully considered the situation on the sub-continent with regard to the relations between India and Pakistan in general and the Kashmir problem in particular. Furthermore, he has paid careful attention to the views put forward by both parties, and he has sought to narrow the differences between the parties on the basis of the twelve proposals of the plan as a whole which was noted with approval by the Security Council on 10 November 1951.

Accordingly, and with reference to paragraph 4 of the resolution of the Security Council of 10 November 1951, the United Nations Representative now wishes to express his view on the problem arising from the lack of an agreement on four of the twelve proposals, as follows:

(a) With regard to paragraph 5 which reads as follows:

"Agree that subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 below the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a single, continuous process;"

the United Nations Representative repeats the view expressed on page 25, paragraph 56, of his report of 15 October 1951 which reads as follows:

"Agreement that the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be effected in a single, continuous process implied, in the opinion of the United Nations Representative, the implementation of part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution, together with paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution as a whole . . ."

(b) In his opinion, paragraph 6 should read as follows:

"Agree that this process of demilitarization shall be

completed on 15 July 1952, unless another date is decided upon by the representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments referred to in Paragraph 9;"

(c) Paragraph 7 should read as follows:

"Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way that on the date referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

A. On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

(ii) the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State, and

(iii) large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place.

B. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;

(ii) further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and States Armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in B (i) above will have been carried out; so that on the date referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion to the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949".

(d) Paragraph 10 to be maintained as it stands, namely:

"Agree that the Government of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarization period referred to in paragraph 6 above;"

The United Nations Representative, in accordance with the request of the Security Council that he give his views on the problem confided to him, has presented this analysis of the problem and his views thereon, with the hope that they will help the Council to assist the parties in reaching an agreement on the problem of demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the more hopeful atmosphere on the subcontinent.

U.N. Committee Approves German Election Plan

*Statements by John Sherman Cooper
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly*

TOWARD A UNITED GERMANY¹

My purpose in speaking again upon the resolution presented by the United Kingdom, France, and the United States is to direct the attention of the Committee to the central issues which the delegation of the United States believes have developed from our deliberations.

At the outset I wish to express the appreciation of my delegation for the genuine interest expressed by all members of the Committee in the problems related to the proposal made by the Governments

¹ Made in the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee of the General Assembly on Dec. 17 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. For a statement by Mr. Cooper on Dec. 5, see BULLETIN of Dec. 24, 1951, p. 1018; for text of the tripartite draft resolution, see *ibid.*, p. 1019.

of France, the United Kingdom, and my country. We welcome the constructive amendments which have been tabled by the delegations of Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, and Uruguay,² and by Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Netherlands, and Norway.³ We believe that these amendments have improved the original resolution and have made more explicit certain points which were implied in the original draft. My Government fully supports the tripartite resolution as modified by these amendments.

The object of this resolution is to secure the aid of the United Nations in taking a necessary step toward the unification of Germany. The unifica-

² U.N. doc. A/AC.53/L.18, dated Dec. 15, 1951.

³ U.N. doc. A/AC.53/L.17, dated Dec. 14, 1951.

tion of Germany is, as every one of us knows, the most profound wish of the German people. In this case, their wish accords with the fundamental interest of the United Nations—the preservation and promotion of peace.

A divided Germany must always endanger the stability of Europe. A united Germany, democratic and nonaggressive in practice and spirit, would reduce the tensions and fears of the people of both Western and Eastern Europe. It could remove one of the major differences between the three Western Powers and the Soviet Union. The unification of Germany will mark a substantial advance toward peace.

The only legal and just way by which Germany can ever be united is as a result of free elections held throughout all of Germany. An apparent agreement on this point by those having responsi-

bility in Germany has been established during this debate. The German people say this is true; the representatives of the Federal Republic of West Germany and the representatives of the Soviet zone say this is true; the three Western Powers and the Soviet Union say this is true.

Real Issue Between East and West Germany

But when we come to discuss the terms of *free elections*, the real point at issue between the Federal Republic of West Germany and the representatives of East Germany and between the three Western Powers and the Soviet Union becomes clear. The real point of difference is this—What are the conditions which make elections really free?

The representatives of every free nation sitting at this table know that there can be no free elec-

Text of Resolution

U.N. doc. A/AC. 53/L. 11/Rev. 2
Adopted December 19, 1951

WHEREAS the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and France, acting on a proposal made by the German Federal Chancellor, have brought before the General Assembly a request for the appointment of an impartial international commission to carry out a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone of Germany in order to determine whether existing conditions there make it possible to hold genuinely free elections throughout these areas,

WHEREAS the statements made by the representatives of the Federal Government of Germany, of Berlin and of the Soviet Zone of Germany before the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee reveal differences of opinion with regard to the conditions existing in these areas, which makes it essential that such an investigation shall be carried out by an impartial body;

The General Assembly,

HAVING REGARD to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations as set out in the Charter, taking due account of the responsibilities of the four Powers regarding Germany, and desiring to make its contribution to the achievement of the unity of Germany in the interests of world peace,

1. *Considers* it desirable to give effect to the above request;

2. *Resolves* to appoint a Commission composed of representatives of Brazil, Iceland, Netherlands, Pakistan and Poland which shall carry out immediately a simultaneous investigation in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone of Germany to ascertain and report whether conditions in these areas are such as to make possible the holding of genuinely free and secret elections throughout these areas. The Commission shall investigate the following matters in so far as they affect the holding of free elections;

(a) The constitutional provisions in force in these areas and their application as regards the various aspects of individual freedom, in particular the degree to which, in practice, the individual enjoys freedom of movement, freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of speech, press and broadcasting;

(b) Freedom of political parties to organize and carry out their activities.

(c) The organization and activities of the judiciary, police and other administrative organs;

3. *Calls upon* all authorities in the Federal Republic, in Berlin, and in the Soviet Zone to enable the Commission to travel freely throughout these areas; and to allow the Commission freedom of access to such persons, places and relevant documents as it considers necessary in the course of executing its task and to allow it to summon any witnesses whom it wishes to examine;

4. (a) *Directs* the Commission to report at the earliest practicable date to the Secretary-General, for the consideration of the four Powers and for the information of the other Members of the United Nations, the results of its efforts to make the necessary arrangements with all the parties concerned to enable it to undertake its work according to the terms of the present resolution;

(b) *Directs* the Commission, if it is able to make the necessary arrangements throughout the areas concerned, similarly to report the findings resulting from its investigation of conditions in these areas, it being understood that such findings may include recommendations regarding further steps which might be taken in order to bring about conditions in Germany necessary for the holding of free elections in these areas;

(c) *Directs* the Commission, if it is unable forthwith to make these arrangements, to make a further attempt to carry out its task at such time as it is satisfied that the German authorities in the Federal Republic, in Berlin and in the Soviet Zone will admit the Commission, as it is desirable to leave the door open for the Commission to carry out its task;

(d) *Directs* the Commission in any event to report, not later than 1 September 1952, the results of its activities to the Secretary-General, for the consideration of the four Powers and for the information of the other Members of the United Nations;

5. *Declares* that the United Nations is prepared, after being satisfied that the conditions throughout the areas concerned are such as to make possible the holding of genuinely free and secret elections, to offer its assistance in order to guarantee the freedom of the elections;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to furnish the Commission with the necessary staff and facilities.

tions any place where there is not general freedom. When I speak of freedom, I speak of a freedom that is honored, that is practiced, and that is protected by law. There may be much talk of constitutions and of laws, but if the freedom proclaimed by such documents is violated in practice, their existence serves only to make more reprehensible the wrong done to man.

We have heard the statements of representatives from the Federal Republic of West Germany and from the Soviet zone, and have noted the sharp conflict in their views.

One fact stands out clearly. The spokesmen of the Soviet zone indicated that they do not want to reveal to an impartial international commission the conditions which exist in their area. The Federal Republic, on the other hand, stated its desire to expose itself to such a test.

The representatives of the Federal Republic spoke of the development of democratic government in Western Germany. It is a developing government. In Western Germany, as in all of Germany, there are some remnants of Nazi sympathy which will demand the continuing opposition of the German people.

The distinguished delegate from Israel has spoken of the dangers of a revival of nazism in Germany. The delegation of the United States understands the concern of his country, one which derives from its experience with Nazi Germany. It is an experience whose recurrence all free nations, and certainly those who were the subjects of its aggression, are striving to prevent. The United States, with the United Kingdom and France, has adhered faithfully to the policy and conviction that these influences should never again become effective.

My Government has not overlooked the factors. The criteria established in the resolution are broad enough to include any real and effective resurgence of nazism. Those who oppose the revival of nazism or totalitarianism of any form should be first to support this inquiry.

But most important, we can say that the institutions which free peoples believe are the true means of preventing force and repression exist in Western Germany. I speak of free elections, free information media, and the civil and political rights of the individual.

The guarantee of freedom in Germany lies in the growth of these institutions and in the fulfillment of the natural desire of the German people for self-government.

Can we believe that similar institutions of freedom exist in East Germany? The representatives of the Federal Republic, drawing upon their own knowledge and from information furnished by thousands of refugees from the Eastern zone, told the story of conditions in East Germany. Some members have suggested that too much attention was devoted to these conditions. It was an unpleasant story, but at times it is necessary that unpleasant stories be heard to serve truth.

Just a few years ago, many people did not want to believe that arbitrary arrest, the secret police, and concentration camps existed in Nazi Germany. It was an unpleasant story. Today, it is unpleasant and fearful to know that these same offenses against liberty and the human spirit exist in somewhat different but equally dangerous forms. But this knowledge is necessary if these conditions are to be changed.

The delegation of the United States believes that the conditions described by the representatives of the Federal Republic exist. If they do not, it is difficult to explain why hundreds of thousands of people will leave their homes and even their families to flee from East Germany to West Germany. This strange one-way traffic—strange because it is against every normal instinct of mankind—flows not from West to East, but only from East to West.

Decisions Facing the General Assembly

Mr. President, the first decision that we must make is to determine whether the General Assembly will undertake any responsibility toward helping solve this very serious world problem. It must decide if the Three Power resolution is reasonable and appropriate as an affirmative step in this direction. In making these decisions, I believe that we ought to take into account the influence that the positive interest and action of the United Nations can bring to bear upon the solution of this problem, and we should not allow that influence to be conditioned on the acceptance or rejection of the resolution by any of the occupying powers.

Now, how does this draft resolution help us in this problem?

If it is permitted to function, the commission established by this resolution would ascertain whether the conditions for free elections exist. If this commission were to report that such conditions do exist, the way would be clear for the Four Powers to agree upon the actual holding of the elections as a first step towards a unified Germany. If the report reveals that conditions in any part of Germany do not permit the holding of free elections, it would at the same time provide impartial findings and recommendations which the four occupying powers could use as a basis for further negotiations.

The reason why a disinterested determination of fact by an impartial body is needed became perfectly apparent when the German spokesmen addressed the Committee. Each group made serious charges against the other. A United Nations commission could report the facts impartially; then action could follow.

It is essential that the German people shall be able to express their will freely and without fear of reprisal. It is important also that they know and have confidence that they can do so.

Whatever the report of the commission may be, it is of the utmost importance that it be made by an independent and impartial authority, in whom all the German people may have confidence. It is a necessity which argues strongly for the establishment of a commission by the United Nations.

I would like now to address myself to the alternative proposals which are the subject of resolutions before the Committee, or which have been suggested in speeches.

U.S.S.R.'s Proposal

The delegate of the Soviet Union has stated that the determination of fact proposed by this resolution is one that can be made only by the German people through the representatives of the Federal Republic and of the Soviet zone.

It is a fact, of course, that there are no freely elected representatives of the Soviet zone. But let us suppose such a conference should be called. It is certain that the first question which must be advanced by the representatives of the Federal Republic is whether conditions exist in East Germany which would permit the holding of free elections. It would be an academic exercise to go forward with the formulation of an election law and arrangements for holding an election until this prerequisite is established.

The argument of the delegate of the Soviet Union has a superficial appeal. On closer examination, it is another reflection of their policy—that of emphasizing the machinery of elections and minimizing the basis of free elections—the conditions of freedom in both zones.

It has been urged by others that this Committee should take no action and defer the question of United Nations assistance until the Four Powers have agreed that conditions suitable to the holding of free elections exist throughout Germany. This proposal finds expression in the resolution introduced by the distinguished delegate of Sweden on behalf of his delegation. My delegation is mindful of the interest which has led to this proposal and to its support by several delegations. Nevertheless, we cannot agree that a recommendation that the four occupying powers should attempt at this time to reach agreement on this matter, is the most affirmative and productive action that can be taken by the General Assembly.

The three Western Powers have submitted this new approach to the General Assembly precisely because our efforts to reach agreement with the Soviet Union have failed.

I have already spoken of the efforts made by the three Western Powers over the past few years to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on the holding of free elections throughout Germany. Their fruitlessness is best recalled by the record of the 73 futile sessions which the four Deputy Foreign Ministers held in Paris earlier this year.

Whatever agreement in principle might be

found, assuming this much could be achieved in a Four Power meeting, the problem of achieving an impartial determination of conditions affecting elections would still remain. It is our view that the practical effect of the Swedish resolution is to deny the possibility of success for this new proposal and to make delay a certainty.

From larger considerations, my delegation cannot join in the view that a resolution of the General Assembly will be a nullity because the Soviet Union and the representatives of the Soviet zone have expressed their opposition.

I do not believe that the General Assembly should assume that the Soviet Union and the representatives of East Germany can always disregard the recommendations of the United Nations and its offer of aid toward the solution of a problem which they say they seek so passionately.

But, if the Soviet Union and Eastern Germany shall continue to refuse the aid and to ignore the recommendations of the General Assembly, the United States still believes that this action by the Assembly is necessary and valuable.

General Assembly's Moral Responsibility

The great authority of the General Assembly does not come from any power to coerce. It comes from the power to recommend—the power to set an international standard of conduct against which actions can be judged by the people of the world. For the General Assembly to refuse to exercise this power because of the fear that its recommendations will not be followed is for it to abdicate its moral responsibility, to cast aside the opportunity which it uniquely possesses of raising the standards of the conduct of nations. This Assembly, we believe, should establish this commission because it is the right thing to do.

To refrain from taking this action because of the threat of a veto by the Soviet zone authorities would lower the prestige and diminish the effectiveness of the United Nations. As a practical matter, this case has already demonstrated the moral force of world opinion, including the opinion of the people of Germany, on the actions of the Soviet Union and its representatives in Eastern Germany. Originally, the East zone authorities opposed free and secret elections. Originally, General Chuikov would not answer letters of the High Commissioners of the three Western Powers on this subject. But the Federal Republic and the Three Powers continued to press the point. Now, the East German authorities and the Soviet representatives alike proclaim their devotion to the idea of free and secret elections. Originally, the Soviet representatives opposed the Pakistani resolution inviting German representatives to express their views before this Committee. But the Committee adopted this resolution. The Federal Republic and the Government of Western Berlin promptly accepted the invitation. The Soviet

Union found itself depicted to the world as a power denying Germans the right to be heard in the United Nations. It reversed its policy, and spokesmen from the Soviet zone suddenly appeared before the Committee.

The distinguished delegate of the Netherlands said in his able speech that the policy of the occupying powers is affected and influenced continuously by the opinion of the German people in all zones of Germany.

We recall that Mayor Reuter told us that conditions in the Eastern zone of Berlin are better than in the major part of the Soviet zone, because of the example of life in the Western zone and the force of its opinion.

The fact that the United Nations has concerned itself with this problem and that it has offered its aid, to be effective immediately, will have its influence on opinion and may hasten the betterment of conditions. I believe that the General Assembly should be confident about the influence of its recommendations.

The opposition expressed here to the sending of the commission should not deter us from adopting this resolution, if we think it is the right thing to do. Not to do so, in my judgment, would be very unwise. It would be a set-back to the hopes of all Germans for progress toward the unity of their country. Specifically, for the people of the Eastern zone, it would dash the hopes which have been aroused by this proposal. The mere existence of this commission will be a standing reminder to the people in the Eastern zone of Germany that the rest of the world has not forgotten them. Its existence will be a standing reminder of the responsibility to those who by their policies delay the growth of democracy throughout Germany. We have offered this resolution because we want to see Germany unified, but with freedom. We have offered it with the purpose of hastening the day when a unified Germany can play a constructive role in the community of nations.

U.S. VIEWS ON RESOLUTION :

The U.S. delegation voted for this resolution because it believes that the resolution can open the way to the establishment of a unified and independent Germany, free to take a responsible place in the community of nations. This was the same reason which prompted my delegation to join with the delegations of France and the United Kingdom in presenting this proposal to the General Assembly.

The present resolution is the product of careful consideration in the *Ad Hoc* Political Com-

^{*} Press statement made by Mr. Cooper following the adoption of the resolution on the German item by the *Ad Hoc* Political Committee on Dec. 19.

mittee. Other delegations have, in the opinion of the sponsors, improved the original draft a great deal with their amendments and suggestions. We believe the resolution as it now stands is a true United Nations document, reflecting the views of many members and reflecting also a basic purpose of our Charter—to eliminate sources of international tension and thus to improve the prospect of peace.

It has been argued against this proposal that the four occupying powers should settle all these matters among themselves. But it has been precisely the refusal of the Soviet Union to come to reasonable agreement on any problem concerning Germany which led the other three occupying powers to request help from the United Nations. It has been further argued that representatives of East and West Germany should settle this particular question of elections. But it was apparent to all who heard these representatives in the Committee that there was no basis of mutual confidence between them. When there is such basic disagreement on facts and conditions and indeed objectives, then is a good time for the United Nations to exercise its unique functions of impartial investigation.

This investigation in Germany, we believe, can do nothing but good. If the commission reports that conditions are such as to make the holding of genuinely free elections possible, the way will be open for the Four Powers to reach agreement on the actual holding of the elections. If the commission finds conditions unfavorable, corrective action can be taken. In either case, progress can be made toward the objective of free and secret elections resulting in the unification of Germany.

My Government is not much troubled by the statement of the Eastern zone authorities that they will not give entry to the commission. We think they may change their minds when it becomes evident to the Soviet Government that its refusal to let the commission in provides too startling a contrast with its professed devotion to the idea of German unity. We are similarly not too concerned by Poland's refusal to serve on the commission. We think they may change their minds, and we hope they will. In any case, we believe the place for Poland should be kept open on the commission in order to demonstrate what I am sure is the desire of the General Assembly: that the commission should be a balanced one giving expression to the chief differing points of view.

CORRECTION

In the BULLETIN of December 3, 1951, p. 879, footnote no. 1 should read: "Made before Committee I (Political and Security) on Nov. 19 and released to the press on the same date."

Reply to Attacks on U.S. Attitude Toward Human Rights Covenant

*Statement by Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

This statement is a reply to the views expressed by Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the Ukraine, and the U.S.S.R. concerning the United States in this Committee. My observations in this statement accordingly relate to these five countries.

I am interested that these five countries place so much stress on the unity of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in our debates here. In 1948 those five countries did not vote for the Declaration. At that time they were critical of it. Now they cite it for their own purposes. They seem to praise the Declaration one time and minimize its importance another time, so that I must question the sincerity of their reliance on the Declaration at this point.

The delegates of a number of these countries expressed concern that an "illusory" Covenant on Human Rights might be drafted in the United Nations. The term "illusory" is descriptive of the type of covenant which the delegates of these countries are seeking to have drafted in the United Nations. For example, the Soviet Union has repeatedly taken the initiative in the General Assembly and in the Commission on Human Rights for the elimination of any provision in the Covenant on implementation. In the General Assembly last year, the Soviet Union proposed that these articles be deleted on the ground that "their inclusion would constitute an attempt at intervention in the domestic affairs of states and would encroach on their States sovereignty." This proposal was rejected in the Third Committee last year in a roll-call vote. Only the five members of this Committee now attacking the United States voted for this proposal. A similar proposal was

rejected by the Commission on Human Rights at its 1951 session.

These countries protest that the implementation of the provisions of the Covenant would be "shameful." What nonsense is this? A Covenant on Human Rights would indeed be illusory if the proposal of the U.S.S.R. were accepted to delete all implementation provisions from it. It seems to me that freedom must be preserved primarily as we were reminded yesterday. The right to think and freedom to speak freely are among the most important rights, and some of you may realize that these are rights that have become rather illusory in some countries.

Even Mr. Vyshinsky himself acknowledges the lack of freedom in his country when he observes in the book he edited on *The Law of the Soviet State* that in his state "there is and can be no place for freedom of speech, press, and so on, for the foes of socialism." Thus he proclaims a so-called freedom for only those supporting the dictates of the state. Freedom is not really freedom unless you can differ in thought and in expression of your thought.

The speakers from these five countries insist over and over again a condition of perfection exists in their countries. It always seems to me that when things are so absolutely perfect that it would almost shine out and you would not have to express it so frequently. I can only say that I wish it were possible for all of us to be allowed to go to the Soviet Union, for example, to see for ourselves the actual conditions which exist there. It would be very helpful if even some impartial observers were allowed to report to us on the actual conditions existing there.

Now let me turn to the charge made by some of the delegates of these five countries that the United States is disregarding the interests of the Negroes in our country. Unfortunately there are instances of American Negroes being victims of unreasoning racial prejudice in my country.

¹ Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural) on Dec. 20 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. For an earlier statement by Mrs. Roosevelt on the Human Rights Covenant, see BULLETIN of Dec. 31, 1951, p. 1059.

However, we do not condone these acts in the United States. We do everything possible to overcome and eliminate such discrimination and racial prejudice as may still exist. Racial discrimination in my country is irreconcilable with the fundamental principles of humanity and justice which are embodied in our Bill of Rights.

The Negro in the U.S.

Affirmative steps are continually being taken to combat racial discrimination. Recently the President of the United States issued an Executive order to insure protection against racial discrimination in employment under Government contracts.

The President has on several occasions established advisory commissions to provide evaluations of the progress being made in the United States. The recommendations of these commissions have served to spur further action to obtain the equality we are seeking in my country. Channing Tobias, now on the United States delegation to the United Nations, was one of the Negroes who served on some of these commissions. Some of the recommendations and reports of those commissions were quoted here which show that we do not hide anything that is wrong.

Acts of prejudice and discrimination by private individuals or groups in my country are more than merely deplored by the Government and by the vast majority of the people of the United States. Not only through laws but also by the process of education and in many other ways, efforts are constantly being made to eliminate racial discrimination. It is the official policy of the U. S. Government, as expressed on many occasions by President Truman, that the remaining imperfections in our practice of democracy, which result from the conduct of small groups of our people, must be corrected as soon as possible.

Increased activity in the political life of our country has been characteristic of Negro Americans. They have become a vital factor in the life of our local, State, and National Government. A reflection of this is seen in the number of Negroes holding Government Civil Service appointments. In 1938 there were 80,000 Negroes holding such appointments; this number has increased to 270,000. Not only has there been an increase in the number of such appointments, but also they are constantly assuming more and more responsible positions in the Government.

Negroes in the United States are voting in increasing numbers in all sections of our country.

It was suggested here that in certain places they were still having difficulty under the poll-tax laws. Those laws are rapidly being changed and in many parts of the country where it was not possible it is now possible for Negro citizens to vote.

In addition, the years from 1940 to the present have seen the election of Negro citizens to a number of important local, state, and national offices.

At the same time I wish to point out we do not claim to have reached perfection. We feel that our recognition of how much more yet remains to be done is a source of strength to us because it serves as a stimulant to press ahead with our task in this respect.

It so happens that the very countries which are criticizing the United States in this Committee are not themselves progressing in the fields of human rights and fundamental freedoms in their own countries. That may be only because of the difficulty of communication, but it seems to us that there is a great silence among the people of those countries. It is the silence of a people shut up behind an Iron Curtain where human rights and life are being stifled.

I will not take the time of the Committee to list all the many economic and social advances taking place in my country. They are well-known to all of you even though the five countries to whom I am addressing my remarks repeatedly disclaim knowledge of these facts. Many of you have traveled in the United States. I will simply mention, however, one point—the number of hours per week that the working man is now working in my country. The Federal Fair Labor Standards Act has established a standard workweek of 40 hours and serves as a deterrent against longer hours by requiring penalty payments for overtime labor. The average of hours worked in all manufacturing industries has now declined to 40½ hours a week. In the railroad transportation industry, the average is 40½ hours a week. In power laundries 42 hours a week is the average. In textile mills, production workers average 41 hours a week. In printing and publishing, workers average slightly less than 40 hours a week.

The charge has also been made that the United States favors two covenants on human rights instead of a single covenant because the United States does not favor economic and social progress in other countries. This is obviously a ridiculous and false argument. It perhaps is unnecessary to answer this argument, since its falsity is so obvious; yet, I should stop for a few minutes to answer it frankly, since from time to time by the repetition of a particular argument, its falsity may soon be forgotten and the fact that it has been repeated so many times without answer tends to lull some into thinking that there perhaps is some merit to the assertion.

What does the record show?

U.S. Aid to Other Countries

The United States Government, in the course of the past 6 years, has made available over 30 billion dollars in the form of loans and grants to various countries. Of this amount, a total of over 5½

billion dollars has been made available to countries in underdeveloped areas. This financial assistance by the U.S. Government does not include our subscription of 635 million dollars to the International Bank. Nor does it include contributions which we have made to U.N. programs such as the International Children's Emergency Fund, the International Refugee Organization, Relief and Rehabilitation for Refugees of Palestine, and the U.N. expanded Technical Assistance Program, contributions which have in large part been used to assist in the improvement of economic and social conditions in underdeveloped areas.

During the fiscal year 1951 alone, the U.S. Government made available on a grant basis over a quarter of a billion dollars for programs of technical and economic assistance to underdeveloped areas.

As is well-known in this Committee, of the total financial contributions to UNICEF—some 155 million dollars—the United States has contributed about 100 million dollars.

Of the 5½ billion dollars made available to underdeveloped areas during the past 6 years by the United States, almost 1½ billion dollars was made available by the U. S. Export-Import Bank. This assistance has been in the form of loans for economic-development purposes to Latin America, the Near East, Africa, and Asia. During a recent period of 1 year, the Bank loaned over 395 million dollars. Of this amount over 96 percent went to underdeveloped areas.

Meeting the needs of underdeveloped areas for basic facilities in such fields as transportation, power, communications, and public health serves as a springboard for attaining higher standards of living for the people in these areas.

I have cited these figures of capital made available for economic development from the United States not for the figures themselves, nor for self-praise. I have cited them only as concrete evidence that the Government and people of the United States are very much interested in the economic development of other countries—and in more than an academic way.

The Congress of the United States this year decided to increase the lending authority of the Export-Import Bank an additional 1 billion dollars. This brings the basic lending capacity of the Bank up to 4½ billion dollars at the present time.

In addition, Congress recently appropriated over 400 million dollars to support a widespread program of economic and technical assistance to agriculture and industry in the Near East, Africa, Latin America, and Asia. These funds are to be made available almost entirely on a grant basis.

The U. S. Technical Cooperation Administration, established about a year ago, has been constantly gaining momentum. During the first year of its expanded program, almost 500 requests for technical assistance were approved. By August

of this year, programs were under way in 36 countries in every part of the world.

In addition, Congress has provided that up to 13 million dollars may be available as the United States contribution to the United Nations expanded Technical Assistance Program for the next fiscal period.

I might also mention that the United States share of the 1950 gross assessment budget of the many specialized agencies, including the International Labor Organization, the International Children's Emergency Fund, and the Palestine Refugee Organization, is always a good and fair share. I would like to point out that no contributions to these organizations have been made by the nations attacking the United States.

We understand the difficulties faced by the Soviet Union in rebuilding her economy after the war. We also understand that she is expending funds to assist the countries along her borders whose economy she is now dominating. But if the Soviet Union would cut down the large expenditures she has continued to make since the end of the war for her large armed forces, she would have more funds and resources with which to build a peaceful economy and to assist other countries.

I am not suggesting that the Soviet Union undertake to assist the economic development of other countries as much as the United States is doing—that would not be possible since our economy is so much stronger than that of the Soviet Union—but I am suggesting that the Soviet Union should make some contribution to the many economic and social programs of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, to show in practice as well as in their speeches that it has a real interest in the economic and social progress of other nations, particularly the underdeveloped countries.

I hope, Madame Chairman, that I have made it amply clear that the support of my delegation for two covenants on human rights does not stem from any lack of interest in the economic and social progress of people in our own country or any disinterest in the economic and social progress of other countries.

The United States supports two covenants because we believe that two covenants would constitute a practical approach to the question before us. We do not believe it advisable as proposed by some delegations that everything go into one covenant. For all the reasons I have previously stated in this Committee, we would make much greater progress in the achievement of human rights and freedoms in the world by the simultaneous completion of two documents—one on civil and political rights and the other on economic, social, and cultural rights, and the attacks of the countries which I have been answering have not changed my point of view on this subject.

U.S. Explains Vote on Yugoslav Item

*Statement by John Sherman Cooper
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

On behalf of the delegation of the United States, I would like to speak briefly of the considerations which led my delegation to support the Yugoslav resolution which has been adopted by the General Assembly.

We have given this resolution our support because it provides a series of reasonable recommendations which, if followed, can lessen the tension between Yugoslavia and the seven states listed in the Yugoslav complaint. It cannot be reasonably doubted that such tension exists. In the *Ad Hoc* Committee, we heard Mr. Djilas describe in detail and with thorough documentation the aggressive campaign which is being pressed by the Soviet Union and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, Albania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland against the Yugoslav Government. The countercharges made against Yugoslavia during the Committee debate by these seven states confirmed at the very least the existence of a serious state of tension.

The resolution is very mild in its terms and in substance recommends that all of the governments concerned should conduct their relations in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations Charter. It notes the statement of Yugoslavia that it is ready to contribute on its part all that is necessary to carry out these recommendations. It is difficult to understand why the Soviet Union and the other members of the Soviet group oppose so strongly this mild resolution. It is difficult to understand how these states can thus deny their clear obligation to conduct their relations with Yugoslavia or with any other state in accordance with the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter.

Again, Mr. President, in voting for the Yugoslav resolution, my delegation supported the Charter principles of national independence, territorial

¹ Made in a plenary session of the General Assembly on Dec. 14 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

Text of Yugoslav Resolution

U.N. doc. A/L.9
Adopted December 14, 1951

The General Assembly,

HAVING CONSIDERED the complaint submitted to it by the delegation of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia concerning the activities of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Governments of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Albania, as well as the Governments of Czechoslovakia and Poland, against Yugoslavia,

VIEWING with serious concern the tension between Yugoslavia on the one side, and the other above-mentioned countries on the other side,

MINDFUL of the purpose of the United Nations "to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace",

MINDFUL of the authority of the General Assembly to "recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair the general welfare or friendly relations among nations",

1. *Takes note* of the declaration of the Yugoslav delegation that the Government of Yugoslavia for its part is ready to do all that is necessary for the carrying out of the recommendations of the present resolution;

2. *Recommends* that the Governments concerned:

(a) Conduct their relations and settle their disputes in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations Charter;

(b) Conform in their diplomatic intercourse with the rules and practices which are customary in international relations;

(c) Settle frontier disputes by means of mixed frontier commissions or other peaceful means of their choice.

integrity, and self-determination of people. In the case of Yugoslavia, these principles are threatened by aggressive pressures designed to subvert and overthrow the Yugoslav Government. If this campaign continues, there is the danger that it

could lead to serious trouble in the Balkans, with repercussions throughout the world. It is clear to all of us that any new recourse to aggression in the world today might strain to the breaking point the fabric of world peace. It is our duty to strive to reduce these strains on peace and to lessen tension wherever it exists.

The Soviet Union and others in its group have called attention to the economic and military assistance now being provided by my country to Yugoslavia. As we have said so often, we are providing this assistance at the request of Yugoslavia in order to help that country increase its ability to defend itself and to maintain its independence. In this connection, our delegation recalled in the Committee the substantial assistance provided by the American people to the Soviet Union during the war against Nazi Germany. This aid was provided, as it is now provided to

Yugoslavia, despite the fact that the people of the United States reject the Communist philosophy and system. We have provided aid in each case because fundamental principles of national independence and territorial integrity were involved in opposition to aggression. We have provided aid to strengthen the security of the free nations, including the United States, against aggression. These principles, set forth so clearly in the Charter, the United States has always supported.

Yugoslavia has declared in the resolution that has been adopted that it is prepared to contribute on its part all that is necessary to carry out its recommendations. We must hope that the countries listed in the Yugoslav complaint will heed the recommendations that now go to them from the General Assembly, and that they will not ignore its spirit. For in truth, that is all the General Assembly really asks.

Importance of Land Reform

*Statement by Channing Tobias
U.S. Delegate to the General Assembly¹*

The U.S. delegation is of the opinion that it is highly appropriate that the question of land reform be considered under the topic of economic development of the underdeveloped countries. This problem, as the Economic and Social Council has stated, is a *necessary part of any effective and comprehensive program of economic development.*

Indeed, the U.S. delegation feels that the problem of land reform has an importance that extends beyond the economic sphere. As the distinguished delegate of India stated at the recent Conference of the Food and Agriculture Organization—"Individual ownership of land by the farmers themselves is one of the best means of promoting the dignity of the individual and of stabilizing the democratic structure of society." He then went on to say that land reform "is fundamental to the democratic future of the world."

We are glad to note that the 66 countries who are members of the Food and Agriculture Organization agreed with this view and adopted a strong resolution on the subject of land reform. They declared that the elimination of anachronisms and

defects from the existing agrarian structures is essential to economic progress. They stated further that such measures will materially contribute to human freedom and dignity. They emphasized the fact that such measures are needed in order to achieve social stability and democratic development.

Land reform is of transcendent importance. It affects the daily lives of that three-quarters of the world's entire population that depends upon the land for its livelihood. In vast areas of Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Latin America, and Africa, where the great majority of the population are farmers, land is at the present time the main source of wealth. Unless that land is held through a system of ownership which best reflects the needs of the people, and unless that land is cultivated by methods best calculated to get maximum results, the economy of the entire world will suffer.

The excellent report which the Secretary-General has prepared in response to the resolution adopted by the fifth session of the General Assembly shows that over a large part of the world such systems of ownership and efficient methods of cultivation do not prevail.

¹ Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Dec. 20 and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date.

What Is Land Reform?

The Food and Agriculture Organization has just enumerated a number of the aspects of this many-sided problem. Its Conference declared "*that in many countries the agrarian structure has most serious defects.*" The FAO Conference pointed particularly to the uneconomic size of farms, the fragmentation of holdings, the maldistribution of landownership, excessive rents, inequitable systems of taxation, insecurity of tenure, perpetual indebtedness, and the lack of clear title to land and water.

If I may be more specific: Let us take a look at the question of interest rates which a farmer must pay in order to buy the seed or the equipment which he needs. In some cases, these rates range from 50 percent to 100 percent a year.

Or, take the question of rents. In some countries tenant farmers have to pay landlords—frequently absentee landlords—rentals as high as 50 to 70 percent of the value of the crops which they produce. Sometimes, they must also pay, in addition, what is in effect, the salary of a middleman—the rent collector.

Sometimes, indeed, the tenant has no assurance that he will be allowed to remain on his land from year to year. How then can he be expected to have either the resources or the desire to improve that land? It has been said that "a man will fight for his farm or his home, but not for a stack of rent receipts." But he will strive to improve his farm or his home if he owns them, or if he has a feeling of security of tenure.

Now, what is it that we have in mind when we talk of land reform? The popular conception of land reform is the breaking up of large estates. Our concept of agrarian reform goes far beyond this. Our concern is with the people who work on the land. Our concern is with a whole series of measures looking toward improving the way of life of the man who actually tills the soil.

To be sure, opportunity to own the land one works is a key part of this concept. But there are other equally important aspects. They include the means for obtaining credit on reasonable terms to purchase land and to acquire the necessary facilities for agricultural production and improved rural living. They include facilities for marketing agricultural commodities at a fair return. They include a system of farm taxation that is not inequitable. They include opportunity for learning improved techniques of agricultural production. They include improved conditions of rural living.

Illustrations of Land Reform

We have already heard the statement of the distinguished representative of China with regard to what has been accomplished through land reform in Taiwan. We look forward to hearing from other of our colleagues as to the accomplishments in their respective countries.

At the recent Food and Agriculture Organization Conference the Japanese delegate described what has recently been accomplished in his country. He stated that before the implementation of the land-reform law, two-thirds of all Japanese farmers rented all or part of the land they cultivated. Rents were usually paid in kind on the basis of about 50 percent of the "normal" crop of the land rented. This, in fact, meant 70 percent or more of the actual harvest. The tenants had no bargaining power. They had no guarantees of secure tenure. Economic instability and social strife were all too prevalent. Tenant disputes and tenant riots occurred frequently.

As a result of the 1946 land-reform laws in Japan the Government purchased rented agricultural land and resold it to the cultivators. The land was paid for with 24-year bonds of the Japanese Government, bearing 3.6 percent interest. Thus, the entire process of shifting ownership was financed locally.

The results have been impressive! The cultivated area operated by tenants has already been reduced from 46 percent of the total cultivated area to 10 percent. Land which is still being rented is subject to fixed rental ceilings. The landlord-tenant relationship is now based on model leases, thus giving the tenant security of tenure. Moreover, in order to insure that the progress which has been achieved will be maintained, the purchase of agricultural land is restricted to those who will actually cultivate it.

The results of the Japanese experiment were summarized by the Japanese delegate to the Food and Agriculture Organization in the following words: "The successful completion of the reforms in land tenure can be considered a major factor for the future improvement of Japanese agriculture and the alleviation of rural unrest. The Japanese farmer today already enjoys a better living standard than ever before as a result of the land reform programme. Even more important however, he has achieved a new social and political status free of domination by nonagrarian interests."

The United States Interest in Land Reform

As many of my colleagues will recall, the subject of land reform was first introduced into this body by Secretary of State Acheson in the opening plenary session of the fifth assembly. He raised this question because of its vital significance to the world.

Our own land-reform history is a long one. It is a democratic one. It goes back to Thomas Jefferson, one of the founders of our country. It was his philosophy that those who till the soil should own it. To him the small landholder was "the most precious part of a state." This is still our philosophy.

As our Secretary of Agriculture has recently said: "Evidently a little bit of land, a little bit of

opportunity can do for world peace something that great armies cannot possibly accomplish. It is something that happens inside a person. It is something that cannot be shot or chained."

Mr. President, the statements of Mr. Jefferson and our present Secretary of Agriculture are not very different. Both agree that a nation of farm owners, a nation where tenants have the opportunity to become farm owners, is a nation possessing the basic elements of political stability.

The legislative history of our land reform began in 1862. In that year my Government started a program to insure that the undeveloped lands in the western part of the United States would be owned by those who cultivated them.

In that year three steps were taken which have shaped the development of American land reform down to the present.

The first was the parceling out of free 160-acre farms to families who would live on them and till them for 5 years.

The second step was the establishment of a national department of agriculture. Its job is to gather and make available information for the benefit of the farmer. It carries on vast research projects. It makes the results of its experiments available so that the farmer may improve the yield of his land. It carries on extension courses in every field of rural life.

The third thing the Federal Government did in 1862 was to give the States large tracts of land for endowing agricultural colleges. Many of our great agricultural institutions today obtain a large part of their income from these lands.

The American people appreciate the foresight of their forefathers. They feel that our family-owned-and-operated farms have strengthened our national economy. We have benefited from the advances made possible by the research and educational services that were begun almost a hundred years ago. The result has been constantly increasing agricultural harvests. In the past 10 years, our farm production has risen 40 percent.

In the meantime we have striven to keep our farm lands in the hands of their cultivators. Over the years we have developed a coordinated system of farm credit at reasonable interest rates. American farmers today can obtain long-term mortgage credit, short-term operating credit, and emergency disaster loans. We have started a system of crop insurance against unavoidable losses due to weather, insects, and plant diseases.

To aid the farmer in purchasing his materials and selling his crops we have encouraged the development of cooperatives. Today, our cooperatives do an annual business of 9 billion dollars. They are active in the fields of production, marketing, purchasing, and servicing farm machinery. They have been particularly successful in making credit available to our farmers.

We have aided the farmer through soil-conservation measures. We have established grading

and standards for his produce. We maintain State and Federal inspection services.

Our Government has also been active in raising the standards of rural living. Through the Federal Rural Electrification Authority, we are helping the small and the poorer farmers to bring electricity into their homes and farm buildings. Fifteen years ago, when this Government program was started, about 10 percent of our farm families had electricity. Today almost nine out of every ten have it.

Our approach to our farm problem is based on a simple fundamental concept. It is to help the farmer help himself. This approach has produced results. Within the past 15 years the number of tenants—those who rent all the land they operate—has declined from 42 percent to 26.8 percent. Share croppers represent less than 8 percent of the rural population. Even in our southern States, where admittedly conditions have been far from perfect and where the problem has been accentuated by racial inequalities, the proportion of farms operated by share croppers has decreased from 21 percent in 1935 to 12 percent at the present time, a decline from 716,000 to 350,000.

Mr. Chairman, what I have said does not in any way imply that we have solved the problem of land tenure in the United States. We still have problems that must be resolved. We still have problems of tenure, land distribution, and migratory farm labor. We are applying ourselves to their solution and we shall continue to do so.

We recognize, of course, that the program developed to meet the needs of the farmer in the United States cannot be applied automatically everywhere. We do feel, however, that some of our techniques might be adaptable to other countries. We intend to do our best to make the results of our own experience available to those who wish to profit by them.

What Has Been Done Since Last Year

Mr. Chairman, my delegation wants to express its great appreciation of what has been accomplished since our last session in the field of land reform. We wish to compliment the Secretary-General for his comprehensive report. It has served to spotlight the problems and the difficulties which exist in this field throughout the world.

As a consequence of this report, the Economic and Social Council adopted a resolution which my delegation had the honor to sponsor. That resolution, while recognizing clearly that no one measure or group of measures can be expected to meet all situations, nevertheless draws to the attention of governments some 16 major types of measures which might be used singly or in combination to remedy existing anachronisms and defects. The resolution also recommends that the United Nations and the specialized agencies pursue certain specific lines of activity. It provides for regular

reporting on this problem and on the progress achieved.

The Food and Agriculture Organization has this very month completed its first full-scale consideration of agrarian reform. The delegates from its 66 member countries took this matter with the greatest seriousness. The Food and Agriculture Organization resolution, to which I have already referred, lays out its own detailed program of work in this field. We hope that the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the UNESCO will take similar steps.

The ground work has been laid for action. We shall look forward to watching progress achieved in member countries.

The Tenets of Land Reform

Meanwhile, if land reform is to become a reality, there are six tenets which we must constantly keep in the forefront.

1. Land reform must come largely from the efforts of governments themselves. It will not come from the outside, irrespective of any assistance that can be made available by other governments or by intergovernmental organizations. Land reform requires a conviction, not only among the people who live on the land. It requires conviction among public officials and national leaders.

2. If the work of the intergovernmental organizations is to be productive in the field of land reform, they will need the full cooperation of

their member governments. This means that the questionnaire called for by the Economic and Social Council, and which governments will be receiving from the Secretary-General, must be treated seriously.

3. There can be technical assistance in the field of land reform only if it is requested by governments.

4. To be most effective, requests for technical assistance in land reform should be related to complementary programs in the field of rural industrial development.

5. There is no one formula that can be applied across-the-board in all countries. Every country has its own problems. Each type of agriculture involves different problems. Every country must determine its own problems.

6. Land reform must be started now. There is little time to ponder over the perfection of ideal schemes. Progress must not be held back merely because one of the many elements of a plan may not be ready for implementation.

The resolution which we are proud to cosponsor with our friends from Brazil, Pakistan, and Thailand requires no further elaboration on the part of the U.S. delegation. It calls for action. We in the United States stand ready—both through the United Nations and bilaterally—to help in carrying forward this great work. I know that the hundreds of millions of people throughout the world who will be benefited will wish the United Nations success in this matter.

U.S. Reports on Pacific Trust Territory

The U.S. Mission to the United Nations on December 18 made public the report of the United States on its administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the year ending June 30, 1951. The report covers the last years of administration by the Department of the Navy. By Presidential order, the administration of the islands was transferred on June 30, 1951, to the U.S. Department of the Interior, the branch of the Federal Government responsible for the conservation and development of natural resources and for the administration of non-self-governing peoples under United States jurisdiction.¹

The trust territory is composed of the Marshall, the Caroline, and the Mariana Islands (except Guam) covering some 3 million square miles of the Western Pacific Ocean north of the equator. The 96 island units, made up of 2,141 individual

islands with a total land area of approximately 687 square miles, are spread over a region 2,727 statute miles in width and 1,477 miles north and south at its widest point. The territory formerly was mandated to Japan and was wrested from that country during World War II.

The indigenous population of the territory on June 30, 1951, was 55,730. Three-fifths of the inhabitants live on the six principal island units: Saipan, the Palaus, Yap, Truk, Ponape, and Majuro. The people are Micronesians, meaning people of the tiny islands. Their cultures vary markedly among island groups and even among islands and atolls in the same geographic areas. This is further complicated by differing degrees of acculturations acquired from contacts with Spaniards, Germans, Japanese, and Americans, each of whom have had a part in history of the islands over the last century and a half. Nine

¹ BULLETIN of July 16, 1951, p. 105.

individual languages are spoken and most of these are subdivided into distinctive local dialects.

On November 6, 1946, while the islands were under military occupation, President Truman announced that the United States was prepared to place the islands under trusteeship, with the United States as administering authority. The draft trusteeship agreement was formally submitted to the Security Council on February 17, 1947, and after slight modification was unanimously approved on April 2, 1947. While the administration of the islands has been conducted by the Department of the Navy, a civilian-type administration (as distinct from military government) has been employed by order of the Secretary of the Navy since July 18, 1947. The Commander in Chief, Pacific, and United States Pacific Fleet, continued to hold the office of High Commissioner of the trust territory until January 8, 1951, when President Truman appointed the Hon. Elbert D. Thomas, former U.S. Senator from Utah, as the first civilian High Commissioner.

The 230-page report, including a pictorial supplement, is preceded by the following review of developments during the year:

During the year July 1, 1950, to June 30, 1951, the peoples of Micronesia have demonstrated increasing ability to undertake responsibility for their political, economic, social, and educational advancement. Understanding and acceptance of democratic principles and procedures have contributed to greater indigenous participation in self-government and judicial affairs. Increased opportunities for interisland contact have stimulated social consciousness of the relations between the various cultures in the Territory. Sharing in the development of economic projects initiated by the Administration has given the people experience in business ventures. Appreciation of the worth of education has increased the numbers of students in the schools and made possible the expansion of the curricula.

Political Developments

Political achievements have been noteworthy both on the municipal and district level. Thirteen more municipalities have chosen to elect their magistrates, thus increasing the number of elected magistrates to 70 percent of those holding office.

The Palau Congress has continued to function well. The Marshall Islands Congress met for the first time on July 4, 1950, and in its deliberations has shown a keen realization of problems of the area. A charter for the Ponape Congress has been prepared in accordance with previously expressed desires of the people and is now being studied by the Provisional Congress which met for the first time in the spring of this year. A charter for the Saipan Congress, giving the Congress advisory powers, is now being discussed by the Saipanese.

Legislative studies have continued to be made at the staff level and recognition of local customs is reflected in the planning for extension of indigenous participation in government. The teaching of the functions of democracy in the schools as well as civil guidance by Administration officials have contributed greatly to the extension and implementation of democratic attitudes. The responsibility for direction of Administrative programs was clarified by the issuance of *Interim Regulation No. 3-50*, reorganizing the Staff of the High Commissioner.

The islanders are playing an increasing part in the judicial system of the Territory. They are members of

several courts and thus are in positions where they can correlate modern law and local indigenous law. Criminal procedures, provisions for law enforcement, provisions for protecting the public health, safety, and morals of indigenes by orders restricting residence, and the Judicial Code have been formalized by the promulgation of *Interim Regulations No. 2-51, No. 4-51, No. 6-51, and No. 8-51*. A "Public Defender and Counselor" was appointed in the fall of 1950 to provide protection for the legal rights of the people and to advise and represent them in civil cases before the courts. The Pacific Islands Insular Constabulary has been reorganized and representative members trained in police and penal procedures at the Constabulary Training School at Truk.

Economic Affairs

The economic situation of the Territory has shown considerable improvement during the past year. This is due both to the further diversification of island economy by Administration-sponsored projects, and to increased production of copra and the high price which it brought on the world market during much of the year. The policy recently adopted by the Administration of making the Island Trading Company the sole exporter of copra and the operation of the previously established Copra Stabilization Fund, benefited copra growers when the price of this commodity collapsed in the spring of 1951.

Money available from the Island Trading Company's Economic Development Fund has been invested in several new projects including poultry and duck breeding, and the planting of cacao. Itc has set aside an additional \$150,000 for the purchase of boats to be used in island passenger and cargo service and two have already been acquired and are in operation. Control of shipping for the benefit of the indigenes has been provided for by *Interim Regulation No. 7-51*.

A survey has been made of the possibility of establishing cattle ranches in the Northern Marianas. Research and survey projects by the Pacific Science Board sponsored by the Office of Naval Research, the United States Geological Survey, and the United States Department of Agriculture have contributed to initiation of further conservation, entomological, and ecological projects.

The Administration has enacted measures for the control of fires and the weed pest lantana by the promulgation of *Interim Regulations No. 5-51 and No. 3-51*. Extensive public works involving improvement of existing facilities, especially dispensaries, schools, and roads, have been constructed. The settlement of land problems has been undertaken in accordance with two *Land and Claims Regulations* issued during the year and some land has already been returned to the owners. Banking facilities have been established by the Island Trading Company and plans for the settlement of various types of claims against the Japanese are in preparation.

Social Improvement

Various programs for social improvement have continued to further a sense of security among the people. More thorough study of conditions in all areas of the Territory has been made possible by the appointment of anthropologists at District Headquarters and in specific areas by the initiation of administrative-medical field trips.

A nutrition survey of both high and low islands, conducted during the year, will provide better information in respect to the efficient utilization of existing food sources. The construction of the model village on Ebeye has been completed and is being utilized by the Marshallese workers employed on Kwajalein. The issuance of *Interim Regulation No. 1-51* has provided laws for divorces, annulments, and adoption.

The medical program has continued to be of great worth to the people and each year sees a corresponding improvement in their health. The medical survey ship U.S.S. *Whidbey* completed its cruise of the Territory in the spring

of 1951 and the data which its staff collected is now being evaluated for use in further improving the health conditions and combatting diseases not yet under control.² A special study of the filariasis problem is being made in the Truk District. *Health Department Orders No. 1* and *No. 2* provide for the care of leprosy patients and the reorganization of the public health system.

Education

The public schools of the Trust Territory are continuing to provide not only academic schooling, but also training in health, improving living conditions, and the responsibilities of citizenship. The number of students in the elementary and intermediate schools has increased³ and more indigenes are teaching in the intermediate schools. The Trust Territory Schools for Medical and Dental Assistants at Guam were closed in December 1950 and the students transferred to the Central Medical School at Suva, Fiji. In the fall of 1950 the Pacific Islands Teacher Training School opened a school of agriculture. A larger number of students are studying abroad in schools of higher education. Vocational training and adult education courses have been established as part of the intermediate school curriculum.

Illiteracy has continued to decline and the appointment of a Supervisor of Languages will further assist in solving this problem. The library program has been expanded by the establishment of libraries at each District Headquarters, directed by indigenes trained at the School of Library Administration held at Truk in the spring of 1951. The fostering of indigenous culture remains an integral part of all educational programs.

Change in Administrative Authority

The transfer of administrative responsibility for the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands from the United States Department of the Navy to the United States Department of the Interior became effective July 1, 1951, pursuant to Executive Order 10265, issued by the President on June 29, 1951. The transfer was accomplished in accordance with the recommendation of the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy, and the Interior on July 18, 1947, that administrative responsibility for the Trust Territory be transferred to a civilian agency of the Government at the earliest practicable date.

Mechanical details of the transfer were worked out by representatives of the Navy and Interior Departments in the spring of 1951 with a view to making the Government of the Trust Territory independent of naval facilities as rapidly as possible. Title to all personal property and structures owned by the Navy and employed by the Naval Government of the Trust Territory in the administration of civil affairs of the Trust Territory, and all funds controlled by the Government of the Trust Territory were transferred to the Department of the Interior or the Trust Territory Government.

The United States Navy provided for civilian-manned sea transportation and air services in the Trust Territory to replace the logistic support hitherto given by Naval vessels and planes. Accordingly, a contract for sea transportation was awarded to the Pacific Micronesian Lines, Inc., a subsidiary of the Pacific Far East Lines, Inc., to service the area. Seven Naval ships, one large cargo vessel and six smaller cargo vessels, with spare parts, were transferred to the Department of the In-

terior to form the fleet as soon as they could be provided with civilian crews. As of June 30, 1951, these ships had been overhauled and fitted with improved passenger accommodations.

In addition, the Navy transferred eight service craft and thirty small craft. A contract for air transport was awarded to Transocean Airlines and four Naval PBV-5A aircraft, overhauled and fitted with spare parts, were transferred on June 30.

All Navy communications stations in the Territory and their equipment were transferred, and the Department of the Interior assumed their operation and maintenance. The Island Trading Company took over the operation of commissary stores, hotels, and messes and will operate them on a self-supporting basis. Navy post offices were disestablished on July 1 and replaced with civil post offices established by the United States Post Office Department. The United States Weather Bureau took over the operation of the weather stations.

The timely substitution of civilian personnel for Naval personnel involved the greatest problem of the transfer. A civilian High Commissioner, appointed by the President on January 8, 1951, arrived at Staff Headquarters at Pearl Harbor on January 27.

In order that the continuity of administration might be maintained in so far as possible, the Navy agreed to release from the service both regular and reserve personnel on active duty with the Trust Territory Naval Administration for employment with the Department of the Interior Administration. Seven officers and thirty-nine enlisted personnel transferred to the new administration. Between February 1 and June 30 the majority of the members of the Naval Staff both at headquarters and in the field were gradually replaced by civilians. Naval personnel remained after the arrival of their successors for as long as was necessary to train the new employees in their duties. Five Naval officers and thirty-five enlisted personnel were retained beyond June 30 for the convenience of the Department of the Interior.

In addition, personnel of Naval Construction Battalions employed on public works projects in the Territory were to remain until their tasks were completed. The Naval Staff at Pearl Harbor prepared a booklet of "Basic Facts" and conducted a brief indoctrination course for the new employees prior to their departure for the field.

The transfer of administration was accomplished with no disruption of administrative services to the people of the Trust Territory. Civil Administrators and field trip officers in each District discussed the transfer with indigenous leaders who in turn explained it to their people. The inhabitants of the Territory cooperated fully in all aspects of this operation.

The Micronesians are fast coming of age in a modern world. They are adopting democratic attitudes and applying them to their government; they are becoming more proficient in economic affairs; they are accepting education designed primarily to assist them in improving their own environment. They are showing an increased understanding of their position as inhabitants of a Trust Territory. The progress of the people in all fields is a tribute to the indigenous culture which the Administering Authority continues to respect in accordance with the requirements and desires of a free people.

Expenditures during the year amounted to \$1,346,509, divided as follows:

General administration, \$211,000; legal and public safety, \$159,000; public education, \$385,000; commerce, industry and agriculture, \$65,000; medical care, public health and sanitation, \$299,000; and public works, \$227,000. Local revenues for the year amounted to \$346,326. Funds appropriated by the United States totalled \$1,014,000. Special appropriations for projects connected with the administrative transfer amounted to \$1,011,400.

² The *Whidbey's* survey cruise lasted 4 years. About 75 percent of the inhabitants received individual physical examinations.

³ More than 90 percent of the children of school age are enrolled in schools. Attendance is about 95 percent of those enrolled.

International Materials Conference

TUNGSTEN AND MOLYBDENUM ALLOCATIONS

The International Materials Conference announced on December 19 that the member governments of the Tungsten-Molybdenum Committee have accepted recommendations for a plan of distribution of tungsten and molybdenum ores, concentrates, and primary products for the first calendar quarter of 1952.

The 13 member countries are Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

This is the third consecutive quarter that these two metals have been allocated by the Imc. Great pressure on available supplies of both tungsten and molybdenum continues. Nevertheless, the Committee is glad to note that the production of both commodities, especially of tungsten, has increased considerably. Along with these increases, however, the total requirements for defense and essential civilian needs have also increased, and estimated requirements still greatly exceed estimated production.

For the first calendar quarter of 1952, the Committee estimates the total production of tungsten in the free world at 3,700 metric tons, and of molybdenum at 4,800 metric tons (metal content in each case).

The Committee has not yet had time to study fully the replies received from governments to its questionnaire on their requirements of tungsten and molybdenum in the first two quarters of 1952. The present plan of distribution is, therefore, provisional for the first quarter of 1952 only, with the understanding that a firm plan for the first 6 months of the year will be worked out, for both metals, as soon as there has been time to complete the study of the replies to the questionnaire. The Committee has recommended that a firm 6-months' plan of distribution for both metals be adopted not later than March 1, 1952. The present provisional allocation will then be merged into the firm 6-months' plan.

In making this latest allocation, the Committee distributed tungsten ores and concentrates on the same basis as it did for the fourth quarter of 1951, with an increase of 12½ percent in the quota for

each country and with the creation of a reserve of about 62 tons for emergency claims and other needs.

In the case of molybdenum, the plan of distribution is identical, so far as concerns the ores and concentrates retained by each country for its own consumption, with the plan adopted for the fourth quarter of 1951. Certain changes have been made in the quotas of primary products allotted, and a reserve has been created of about 40 tons for emergency claims and other needs.

In carrying out the allocations agreed upon, the governments, both of the producing and of the consuming countries, are expected to continue to take upon themselves the obligation of taking whatever action is necessary to render the agreed quotas effective. Consuming countries are asked, if necessary, to buy any part of their quotas which their private importers might refuse to purchase, and producing countries are urged to insure, to the best of their ability, that estimates of production are realized in order to fulfill the pattern of distribution.

Existing contracts will be respected, so far as is possible, in carrying out the allocation arrangements. If, however, such contracts provide for the supply of tungsten or molybdenum to any one importing country in excess of the amounts allocated, it is proposed that the importing country should divert shipments to other importing countries which have not yet filled their import quotas, so far as is possible without upsetting the original contractual arrangements.

Procedures for the review of the operation of the plan, for the adjustment of quotas, and for reports will again be the same as those laid down for the two previous allocations. The operation of the plan will be kept under constant review by the Committee by a system of monthly reviews. Any adjustments necessary because of the nonfulfillment of any part of this plan will be rectified in the 6-months' period following the end of the quarter.

Other interested governments which are not members of the Committee have been informed of the plan of distribution. Under the Committee's

rules of procedure, any such governments may, upon request, present further explanations of their interests orally to the Committee.¹

COBALT ALLOCATION

The International Materials Conference announced on December 28 that the governments of the 11 countries which are represented on the Manganese-Nickel-Cobalt Committee have accepted the Committee's recommendations for a provisional allocation of cobalt for the first calendar quarter of 1952.² These countries include Belgium (representing Benelux), Brazil, Canada, Cuba, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, India, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The Committee has estimated that the total production of cobalt metal, oxides, and salts in the free world will increase in the first quarter of 1952 to reach approximately 2,200 metric tons. The fourth quarter 1951 production is now presumed to be about 1,960 tons, which is less than previous estimates on which fourth quarter allocations had been based.

Although cobalt output is expanding in the free world, requirements for both direct defense and essential civilian consumption are growing to such an extent that they will still greatly exceed the availabilities. In view of this situation, it has been agreed that cobalt should be maintained under allocation.

Owing to the lack of time, the Committee has not yet had the opportunity to examine in detail the Governments' replies to the questionnaire on requirements for the first quarter of 1952, as many of the returns were not received on the date by which they had been requested.

The present quarterly plan of distribution is provisional only. The Committee intends to recommend at the earliest possible time a final allocation based on a careful study of each country's situation, as reflected in its reply to the questionnaire. This allocation would cover the first 6 months of 1952 or any other period which may be found more appropriate. The present provisional plan will then be incorporated into this final allocation.

The provisional plan of distribution has been forwarded to all interested governments for immediate implementation. Governments are expected to take whatever action is necessary to make this plan effective, it being understood that it will be superseded by a final allocation plan at a later date.

¹ For table of allocations, see *Imc* press release of Dec. 19.

² For table of allocations, see *Imc* press release of Dec. 28.

U.S. Delegation to International Conference

World Health Sessions (WHO)

On January 3 the Department of State announced that two organs of the World Health Organization (WHO) are to hold meetings at Geneva, Switzerland, in January 1952. The Executive Board's Standing Committee on Administration and Finance will convene on January 7. The ninth session of the Executive Board will open on January 21.

Because of the inability of H. van Zile Hyde, U.S. representative on the Executive Board, to attend the forthcoming meetings, the President has designated Frederick J. Brady, assistant chief, International Organizations, Division of International Health, Public Health Service, Federal Security Agency, to serve as acting U.S. representative. Other members of the U.S. delegation to the two meetings are

Advisers

Howard B. Calderwood, Office of U.N. Economic and Social Affairs, Department of State
Donald Blaisdell, U.S. representative for specialized agency affairs, Geneva, Switzerland

The Executive Board Standing Committee on Administration and Finance, composed of seven members, makes recommendations to the Board on subjects pertaining to personnel and financial policies, administrative matters, and on the Director General's budget proposals.

The Executive Board, which meets at least twice yearly, is composed of representatives designated by 18 member nations elected by the Assembly for 3-year terms. Acting as the executive organ of the World Health Assembly, the Board gives effect to the decisions and policies of that body. The last session of the Executive Board was held at Geneva, June 1-8, 1951.

The agenda for the forthcoming meetings includes consideration of numerous items, such as program and budget for 1953; technical-assistance programs for 1953; continuation of study on organizational structure and administrative efficiency of the WHO; the applications of certain nongovernmental organizations for official relations with the WHO; the assignment of Pacific territories for purposes of regional organization; medical-supply services to member states; action arising out of the resolutions of the fourth World Health Assembly (Geneva, May 7-25, 1951) regarding international sanitary regulations and related matters; and the reports of various expert and regional committee meetings.

U.N. Considers Reservations to Multilateral Conventions

STATEMENT BY BENJAMIN V. COHEN¹

We should like to make a few observations on the question of reservations to multilateral conventions. The observations which we shall make relate both to the opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding reservations to the Convention on Genocide and to the report of the International Law Commission on this subject.

It has been the general practice of the United States to accept and follow the advisory opinions of the Court, even in cases—like that of right of the United Nations to present claims for injuries sustained in the service of the United Nations—where the United States advanced in its arguments before the Court views different from those reached by the Court in its opinions. We believe that the Court's conclusions in its opinion regarding reservations to the Convention on Genocide are generally sound, and we hope that they will be accepted by all states concerned.

We appreciate that broad generalizations on the effects of reservations to multilateral treaties may be dangerous. Reservations may be readily compatible with the object and purpose of some unilateral conventions and not with the object and purpose of others. We strongly approve the reasoning of the Court in the genocide case that reservations are not necessarily incompatible with a multilateral treaty merely because of the objection of one of the parties. On the other hand, we would not suggest that reservations acceptable to some of the parties should always be regarded as compatible with a multilateral convention unless expressly excluded by its terms. Even in the absence of express treaty provisions, the nature and character of some multilateral treaties like that of the Charter of the United Nations might clearly exclude reservations save with unanimous consent.

But we cannot agree with the International Law Commission's suggestion that, in the absence of treaty provisions to the contrary, reservations to

a multilateral treaty should be allowed only if unanimously accepted by all parties. Such a suggestion would not only give every party the right to decide whether it would itself accept a reservation, but would give it the right to veto the acceptance of a reservation by every other party to the treaty.

We think it important to distinguish between the undoubted right of a state, party to a treaty, to refuse to accept so far as it is concerned a reservation made by another state from the question of its right to prevent other parties from accepting a reservation if they wish to do so. In our view, a party to a treaty has a right to object to a reservation so far as it is concerned whether or not the reservation is compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.

We also suggest that a party to a multilateral treaty may object to a reservation affecting a particular and separate part of the treaty and refuse to be bound by that particular and separate part of the treaty in its relations to the reserving state without objecting or intending to object to the reserving state becoming a party to the treaty in all other respects. If we wish to encourage the progressive development of international law through multilateral treaties, we should avoid hasty generalizations regarding the unexpressed intention of the parties in regard to the legal consequences of objections to reservations.

We can see no sound reason for treating the objection of a single party as conclusive, irrefutable proof of the incompatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of a multilateral treaty so far as other parties are concerned, or even as conclusive, irrefutable proof of the unwillingness of the objecting state to accept the reserving state as a party to the treaty in any respect. If the parties to a multilateral treaty intend any such result, let them say so. If they do not evince any such intention, we see no reason for attributing to them such an intention. There is little basis in fact for assuming the general existence of such an intention in light of the accepted and widespread practice to the contrary among American states.

We have had considerable experience in recent years with the operations of the principle of

¹ Made in Committee VI (Legal) of the General Assembly on Dec. 5, 1951, and released to the press by the U.S. Mission to the U.N. on the same date. Mr. Cohen is a U.S. delegate to the General Assembly.

unanimity in the Security Council. Experience with the operation of the veto in the Security Council does not warrant the extension of the principle of veto to the treatment of reservations to multilateral treaties. Indeed, in our judgment, experience counsels strongly against the extension of the principle of veto into this field of treaty-making.

While we believe, as the International Law Commission suggests, that organs of the United Nations, specialized agencies, and states should in the course of preparing multilateral treaties give thought to the insertion therein of provisions relating to the admissibility or nonadmissibility of reservations and to the effect to be attributed to them, we recognize that in many cases the contracting parties may prefer to rely upon the general principles applied by the International Court of Justice in the Genocide opinion than attempt in advance to determine what reservations would and what reservations would not be compatible with the treaty. It is not always easy in advance to state the specific standards to be applied in determining the compatibility of many reservations the exact character of which cannot be clearly foreseen or readily defined.

If we assume the parties do not wish to exclude the possibility of reservations compatible with the object and purpose of the treaty, then we do see why the question of the compatibility of a particular reservation should be subject to *liberum veto* by any one party not only in relation to its own rights but in relation to those of all other parties. The fact that different parties take different views regarding the compatibility of a particular reservation with a multilateral treaty presents no more difficult problem than that presented when different parties take different positions regarding other important matters arising out of a multilateral treaty. A dispute as to the compatibility of a particular reservation with a treaty—the question whether its acceptance by some states adversely affects the rights of nonaccepting states—can be determined in the same way as other disputes under the treaty.

If the parties to a particular treaty should wish to have the issue of compatibility determined by a poll of the parties, we should think that it would probably be preferable for them to have the treaty leave the decision to a majority vote than accord a right of veto to every party. But even in such a case it would be unwise to generalize without knowing the nature and object of the particular treaty.

Certainly in light of our own experience and that of other American states we repeat that there is little or no basis in fact for assuming that the parties to a multilateral treaty intend to exclude all reservations not unanimously accepted by the parties. We believe that the adoption of any artificial rule which would attribute any such intention to the parties or to give such an effect to the absence

of a reservation clause would unjustifiably and arbitrarily limit the treaty-making power of sovereign states.

Let us remember that we have not yet developed for most matters which are the subject of multilateral treaties a world legislature. We must therefore rely in many fields upon treaties to supply workable rules of laws between the parties. In our judgment we do not advance the progressive development of international law through multilateral treaties by insistence on unanimous consent to reservations.

We recognize the desirability of uniformity, simplicity, and certainty in international law, but not at the expense of throttling the process of multilateral treaty-making. Generally speaking we do not favor a theoretical uniformity which militates against the widest possible acceptance of treaty law.

It is possible that a flexible rule regarding reservations may have a tendency to some extent to stimulate the making of reservations, but it should be remembered that the flexible rule which we urge does not impose a duty on any state in relation to its own rights to accept any reservation. A unanimous consent rule regarding reservations may discourage reservations, but it will also discourage not only the ratification but the signing of multilateral treaties.

Some may say that negotiators should not sign unless they are willing to ratify as signed. But if negotiators feel that their governments must accept a treaty as signed without reservations, negotiators may become increasingly reluctant to sign. When it is recalled, that the wording of clauses in a multilateral treaty may be determined in a conference by a small majority including some states which may never sign or ratify, the wisdom of attaching excessive importance to maintaining the absolute integrity of the original text may well be questioned.

In this connection I should like to quote from the advisory opinion of May 28, 1951 of the International Court of Justice:

... The majority principle, while facilitating the conclusion of multilateral conventions, may also make it necessary for certain States to make reservations. This observation is confirmed by the great number of reservations which have been made of recent years to multilateral conventions.

In this state of international practice, it could certainly not be inferred from the absence of an article providing for reservations in a multilateral convention that the contracting States are prohibited from making certain reservations. Account should also be taken of the fact that the absence of such an article or even the decision not to insert such an article can be explained by the desire not to invite a multiplicity of reservations. The character of a multilateral convention, its purpose, provisions, mode of preparation and adoption, are factors which must be considered in determining, in the absence of any express provision on the subject, the possibility of making reservations, as well as their validity and effect.

Bearing in mind the way that the texts of multilateral treaties are prepared, we think that

it is quite unrealistic to say that negotiators should not sign a treaty unless they are satisfied that their governments will ratify as signed. It may be that states having a cabinet-parliamentary form of government may feel that their representatives if they sign a treaty can go rather far in committing themselves to favoring ratification without reservations. But representatives of states like the United States in which the executive and legislative branches of government are separate and independent, simply cannot be certain whether their legislatures will be prepared to ratify a treaty as signed without reservations.

In some cases, like the Charter of the United Nations, it is clear that states must ratify without reservation or not at all. But we reiterate we do not think that that is the situation with the generality of multilateral treaties.

We do not, of course, mean to suggest that those who participate in the negotiation of multilateral treaties do not have a responsibility to discourage the attachment by their national legislatures to the ratification of multilateral treaties of confusing and incompatible reservations. We think that the International Law Commission has performed a valuable service in calling attention to this responsibility and the very genuine difficulties which may arise from the making of confusing and incompatible reservations, particularly in the case of multilateral treaties.

But the political factors and difficulties involved in treaty-making and treaty ratification cannot be dispelled by any simple rule of law. Politics is an art rather than a science. A rule of law which destroys a state's reservations to a treaty may also destroy a state's participation in a treaty. A treaty widely accepted, although not absolutely uniform in its application to all parties, may be far more preferable than a treaty, theoretically uniform in its application, but effective only as between a relatively few states.

If this Committee or the Assembly is to make any recommendations regarding reservations to multilateral treaties, we feel that we must subordinate the yearning of our profession for uniformity, simplicity, and certainty to the facts of political life which determine the actions of states. We feel that the conclusions of the International Law Commission, if accepted, might possibly simplify the law relating to reservations to multilateral treaties, but would make that law a much less useful instrument in the adjustment of relations between states in the world in which we live.

We see no reason for attempting to give judicial

significance to the administrative functions performed by the Secretary-General in connection with the ratification of treaties. The task of the Secretary-General should be to receive ratifications with or without reservations, to inform all states concerned thereof and to receive such objections as they may make thereto, and to notify all states concerned of such objections. If the Secretary-General has a doubt as to his duty under any treaty, he may seek the advice of the Assembly or, through the Assembly, of the Court.

We are proposing a resolution which will authorize the Secretary-General to continue to perform the valuable administrative services which he has performed in connection with the deposit of documents relating to ratifications of and reservations to treaties without passing on the legal effects of the documents. We think it unwise that we should attempt to anticipate and decide in advance the legal rights of the parties under different treaties and under varying circumstances.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION

U.N. doc. A/C. 6/L. 205
Adopted Jan. 4, 1952

The General Assembly,

BEARING IN MIND the provisions of resolution 478 (V) which (1) requested the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion regarding reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and (2) invited the International Law Commission to study the question of reservations to multilateral conventions,

NOTING the Court's advisory opinion of May 28, 1951, rendered pursuant to the said resolution, and the Commission's report, rendered pursuant to the said resolution,

Recommends that the organs of the United Nations, the specialized agencies and states should, in the course of preparing multilateral conventions, consider insertion therein of provisions relating to the admissibility or non-admissibility of reservations and to the effect to be attributed to them;

Requests the Secretary-General in relation to reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to conform his practice to the advisory opinion of the Court of May 28, 1951;

Recommends to all states that they be guided in regard to the Convention on Genocide by the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of May 28, 1951;

Invites the Secretary-General in respect of future conventions concluded under the auspices of the United Nations of which he is depositary:

(A) to continue to act as the depositary in connection with the deposit of documents containing reservations or objections, without passing upon the legal effect of such documents, and

(B) to communicate the text of such documents relating to reservations or objections to all states concerned, leaving it to each state to draw legal consequences from such communications.

The United States in the United Nations

[December 27, 1951-January 9, 1952]

General Assembly

Committee I (Political and Security)—A resolution carrying forward the recommendations of the Collective Measures Committee (CMC) and directing it to continue for another year its work of strengthening the United Nations collective security system was adopted by the Committee January 8 following a one-week debate. The vote on the resolution, which was sponsored by the United States along with 10 other members of the 14-member CMC, was 51-5 (Soviet bloc)-3 (India, Indonesia, Argentina). A Soviet move to abolish the CMC failed 52 (Argentina)-5-2.

The approved text, which was revised during the course of the debate to meet certain detailed objections by groups of Latin American and Middle Eastern States, recommends that member states take a number of specified measures to enable them—and the specialized agencies and regional defense arrangements to which they belong—to contribute promptly and effectively to United Nations collective action.

Speaking in support of the joint proposal, U. S. Representative Benjamin Cohen said, in part:

The report of the CMC and the resolution before us . . . are based on the proposition that the more effectively the members of the United Nations are organized to unite their strength to maintain international peace and security, the less likely it is that world peace will be challenged. . . . The program we in this Assembly are embarked on is designed to be universal in application, to meet any aggression from any source. It is not directed against any State or group of States. . . . We hope the day will come soon when the Soviet Government will see that its best interests are served by the development of an effective United Nations collective security system, and will lend its active support to the work. . . .

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky angrily denounced the 11-power resolution as a "monstrous" and "war-like" move, and submitted a counterproposal for an immediate high-level Security Council meeting to remove international tension, with "measures . . . to help to bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations being held in Korea" as the first order of business. However, by the time the Soviet formulation, which was strenuously opposed by the United States and

others as an attempt to delay the cease-fire talks and frustrate Assembly efforts to develop collective security, came to a vote, it had been amended, on the joint initiative of France, the United Kingdom, United States, and Brazil to provide simply for a high-level Security Council meeting whenever the Council considered that this might prove useful to ease world tension. The revised text, which made no mention whatever of Korea, was adopted on January 9 by a vote of 50 (U.S., U.S.S.R.)-0-8.

Later the same day, the Committee approved, 47-6 (Soviet bloc, Chile)-3 (Burma, Afghanistan, Mexico) a United States motion to postpone consideration of the next agenda item on the independence of Korea. This action was taken on the understanding—voiced by U.S. Representative Ernest Gross—that

if as we hope, the armistice negotiations are successfully concluded—or, if other developments in Korea should require the matter to be reconsidered, the Committee would take up the many important questions regarding Korea which would then fall within its province.

Ad Hoc Political Committee—Action on Treatment of Indians in South Africa was completed by the Committee January 5 with the adoption 41 (U.S.)-2 (Australia, South Africa)-13 of an amended India-Indonesia-Iraq-Burma-Iran resolution recommending the establishment of a 3-member commission to assist the parties (India, Pakistan, and South Africa) to carry through appropriate negotiations. The Secretary-General was requested, in the event the members of the commission were not nominated within 60 days, himself to undertake the task of helping the three nations to negotiate a settlement of their long-standing dispute.

The idea of having the Secretary-General act as intermediary if the commission plan failed was advanced by Israel in the form of an amendment to the joint draft, after support had developed for an earlier United States suggestion to bring the United Nations official into the picture. The United States abstained on a provision—adopted 31-9-17—calling on South Africa to suspend implementation of the Group Areas Act.

On January 7 the Committee opened consideration of the report of the Palestine Conciliation

Commission. A U.S.-U.K.-French-Turkish resolution was introduced continuing the Commission with its terms of reference unchanged but transferring its headquarters from Jerusalem to New York. The United Nations, U. S. Representative Philip Jessup held in support of the four-power proposal, had the right to expect the parties to make every endeavor to settle their differences themselves, but it should at the same time always be ready to aid them.

Committee II (Economic and Financial)—Consideration of the subitem on integrated economic development was completed by the Committee at meetings January 2-5, with the adoption of two resolutions on this question. Approval 26 (U.S.)-0-14 was given to an amended Haitian proposal, which, as redrafted by the United States, requests the Economic and Social Council to study "varying ways in which the productivity of peoples everywhere can be increased by the application of existing scientific and technological knowledge." The other resolution—a unanimously-approved compromise text reconciling a Polish proposal with United States and other amendments thereto—dealt with current price and supply problems without mentioning the fact that they had their origin in defense needs. Specifically, it called on U.N. members to consider entering into commercial agreements to facilitate the movement to underdeveloped countries of machinery, equipment, and industrial raw materials.

On January 7, the Committee opened discussion of the subitem on land reform. Two resolutions have been introduced, a joint U.S.-Pakistan-Thailand-Brazil-Israel text calling for a broad approach to the problem based on the conditions and needs of individual countries, and a Polish draft stressing large-scale material assistance to farmers, return of foreign-held agricultural lands, etc.

In submitting the joint text, U.S. delegate Channing Tobias explained that the United States approach to the problem of land reform was "based on a simple, fundamental concept. It is to help the farmer to help himself. . . . Our concern is with the people who work the land." Following conclusion of the general discussion, which centered on the experiences of individual countries, the chairman requested the sponsors of the various proposals and amendments to attempt to work out an agreed text.

Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)—Examination of the refugee problem was inaugurated in the Social Committee January 2 with a statement by G. J. Van Heuven Goedhart,

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, in which he urged the Assembly to authorize his office to issue an appeal for (voluntary) contributions to a 3 million dollar fund for emergency assistance to the most needy of the approximately 1½ million refugees under his mandate. He also sought authority to open branch offices in various parts of the world and asked the Committee to help him persuade governments to ratify the recently adopted Convention on the Status of Refugees.

Committee IV (Trusteeship)—The Anglo-French resolution on the Ewe and Togoland unification problem was adopted by the Committee January 2 following incorporation of a series of amendments sponsored by a group of non-administering powers. The vote was 35 (U.S.)-0-12, with France and the United Kingdom abstaining on the ground that the revised text would have the effect of delaying a settlement of the problem.

The approved resolution recommends that Britain and France consult fully with the various indigenous groups concerned before going through with their plan to set up a Joint Council for Togoland Affairs to advise them on matters of common concern to their adjacent trust territories (French and British Togoland). (The prounification parties have objected to the procedures devised for selecting the Council.) Is also recommended extending the scope of the Council and instructed the Trusteeship Council to arrange for an on-the-spot study of the problem.

The Committee then went on to approve a series of resolutions arising out of the report of the Trusteeship Council. These included U.S.-supported proposals to request the Council (1) to constitute a Standing Committee for the Examination of Petitions to meet between as well as during Trusteeship Council sessions, and (2) "to examine the possibility of associating the inhabitants of the trust territories more closely in its work," as well as a U.S.-opposed text recommending association of nonmember countries of the Council with the activities of its subsidiary organs.

"Additional Measures To Be Employed to Meet the Aggression in Korea"—Haiti and Mexico have informed the U.N. Secretariat that they have embargoed the shipment of arms, ammunition, implements of war, etc. to areas under Chinese Communist or North Korean control, as recommended by the General Assembly in its May 18, 1951 resolution. A total of 69 communications concerning implementation of this resolution have now been received from 62 member and non-member nations.

Agriculture

Importance of land reform (Tobias) 63

Aid to Foreign Countries**ECA:**

Closing of, functions replaced by Mutual Security Administration 43

Marshall Plan, completion and successful accomplishments 43

Marshall Plan objectives in Western Germany largely accomplished 45

American Republics**BRAZIL:** Military assistance negotiations with U.S. 47**GUATEMALA:** Declaration of death of missing persons, convention on 49**Asia****INDIA:** Point 4 agreement signed 47**JAMMU AND KASHMIR:** Demilitarization of, 2d report (Graham) 52**JORDAN:** To receive wheat from U.S. 48**KOREA:** Soviet proposal on armistice negotiations, U.S. views (Acheson), text 46**Europe****GERMANY:**

U.N. committee approves election plan, statements (Cooper), text of resolution 54

Marshall Plan objectives largely accomplished (McCloy) 45

SPAIN: Granted cotton credit by Export-Import Bank 47**U.S.S.R.:** Proposal on Korean armistice negotiations, U.S. views (Acheson), text 46**YUGOSLAVIA:** U.S. support of resolution explained (Cooper), text of resolution 62**Finance**

Spain granted cotton credit by Export-Import Bank 47

Foreign Service

Letter of credence (Sen) 49

Human Rights

Defense of U.S. attitude (Mrs. Roosevelt) 59

International Meetings**IMC:** Tungsten and molybdenum allocations 69**IRO:** Report on (Warren), 8th session 50**U.S. DELEGATION:** Executive Board (Who), 9th session 70**Mutual Aid and Defense****Brazil-U.S. negotiations on military assistance 47****Jordan to receive U.S. wheat 48****Strategic Materials**

Cobalt allocations 70

Tungsten and molybdenum allocations by Imc 69

Technical Cooperation and Development**POINT 4:**

Agreement signed with India for expansion of program 47

Treaty Information

Point 4 agreement signed with India, expansion of program 47

Reservations to multilateral conventions considered by U.N. (Cohen) 71

Trust Territories**NON-SELF-GOVERNING:** Trust territory of the Pacific Islands, U.S. report on 66**United Nations****GENERAL ASSEMBLY:**

Convention on death of missing persons to enter into force 49

German election plan approved (Cooper), text 54

Korean armistice negotiations, Soviet proposals, U.S. views (Acheson), text 46

U.S. support of Yugoslav resolution explained (Cooper), text 62

Human rights, defense of U.S. attitude toward (Roosevelt) 59

IRO: Report on (Warren), 8th session 50

Reservations to multilateral conventions considered (Cohen) 71

SECURITY COUNCIL: Demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir, 2d report 52

Trust territory of the Pacific Islands, U.S. report on 66

U.S. in the U.N. (weekly summary) 74

WHO: Executive Board, 9th session 70*Name Index*

Acheson, Secretary Dean 46
 Bowles, Chester 47
 Cohen, Benjamin 71
 Cooper, John Sherman 54, 62
 Evans, S. Joseph 78
 Johnson, Herschel V. 47
 McCloy, John J. 45
 Nehru, Jawaharlal 47
 Roosevelt, Mrs. Franklin D. 59
 Sen, Binay Ranjan 49
 Tobias, Channing 63
 Warren, George L. 50